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Revisiting Park ‘N Fly: In Pursuit of Constraints on Trademark Bullies
Abstract
The Supreme Court has been inextricably constraining the trademark right in the last 15 years. The Court first
embarked in a wholesale expansion of the trademark right and now the Court is engaged in an effort to rein it
back in.
The expansion started in 1985 with Park ‘N Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly. The Court there held that a descriptive
and otherwise unenforceable trademark is made enforceable and the appropriate subject of an offensive action
to enjoin a competing use if it is incontestable. The Court overruled Park ‘N Fly by implication with KP
Permanent Makeup v. Lastings. In KP Permanent Makeup, the Court held that a descriptive mark used
descriptively is fair use which the mark hold must tolerate.
KP Permanent Makeup appears to be only a fair use case and has been heralded as an important case
clarifying fair use in trademark jurisprudence. It also emasculates the incontestability doctrine. Although there
are other uses of incontestability, its primary use for descriptive marks is to rescue them from cancellation and
allow them to be used offensively in enforcement actions if incontestable. With KP Permanent Makeup, a user
of a descriptive but incontestable mark only need to make they claim that they are using it descriptively to
entirely shift the analysis from the use of someone else’s incontestable mark to fair use.
This curtailment should come as no surprise to anyone. The Court first expanded trademark jurisprudence
with Park ‘N Fly, Taco Cabana and Qualitex, and then constrained it with Traf Fix, Wal-Mart, and Dastar, now
KP Permanent Makeup. What is surprising is the fact that, with KP Permanent Makeup, Park ‘N Fly has been
overruled by implication and the incontestability doctrine has been made superfluous. The expansion of
trademark rights encourage trademark speculation and this speculation led to trademark bullying. Its
constraint should have the effect of reining in trademark bullies as well.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court breathed life into the
"incontestability" doctrine of trademark jurisprudence in Park 'N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc.' This case stands for the proposition
that the holder of a descriptive mark may use it offensively to enjoin
other users of the trademark if the mark is registered and if that
registration has become incontestable under the Lanham Act. 2
Descriptive marks are usually not enforceable as "merely descriptive"
marks that do not possess secondary meaning and, therefore, fail to
identify a source. In order to be enforceable, a descriptive mark either
has to have secondary meaning or, after Park 'NFIy, must be the subject
of an incontestable registration.
4
In 1993, I wrote an article where I argued that incontestability was
inconsistent with the traditional trademark jurisprudence and, as such,
was illegitimate.5 Since the notion of incontestability is inconsistent
with the very common law of trademarks that the Lanham Act purports
to codify, it is illegitimate, I argued, and should be abolished.6 Courts,
I argued, were very uncomfortable with the notion of incontestability
because it was a distinct departure from the common law of trademarks
as it existed in 1947 (the year the Lanham Act took effect) and,
therefore, had not come to a nationwide, consistent conclusion about its
true meaning and significance.
7
In 2004, the Supreme Court held in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc.
v. Lasting Impressions I, Inc. that a descriptive mark that is used
descriptively is subject to the fair use defense even if it is subject to a
registration that is incontestable. 8 The Court did not take on the
incontestability doctrine squarely;9 however, the Court's holding has
had and will continue to have major ramifications for the doctrine and
policy behind incontestability. In fact, although it took twenty years,
the Supreme Court has apparently finally agreed with me: The effect of
KP Permanent Make-Up is to eviscerate incontestability (or so severely
1 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985) (holding
that an incontestable but descriptive mark is valid and enforceable).
2 Id. at 189.
3 Id. at 196.
4 Id. at 205.
5 Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV.
519 (1993).
6 Id. at 569.
7Id. at 566.
8 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 124
(2004) (holding that a descriptive mark used descriptively is fair use and an injunction
is inappropriate even if the mark is incontestable).
9 See id.
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restrict the concept of incontestability that it may as well be abolished).
This article juxtaposes the trademark jurisprudence of the Park 'N
Fly decision (the Park 'N Fly doctrine) with that of the KP Permanent
Make-Up jurisprudence (the KP Permanent Make-Up doctrine). It
concludes that the KP Permanent Make-Up doctrine so eviscerated the
Park 'N Fly doctrine that it should be seen as having overruled Park 'N
Fly by implication.
Taken alone, KP Permanent Make-Up appears to be doctrinally
troubling in light of Park 'N Fly. After KP Permanent Make-Up, one
has to wonder what might be the value of an incontestable registration
of a descriptive mark. In Park 'N Fly, the answer to that question was
easy: an incontestable but descriptive trademark registration was as
good as any other registration. 1 0 However, KP Permanent Make-Up
eviscerated that concept. KP Permanent Make-Up has overruled Park
'N Fly, sub silentio.11
However, KP Permanent Make-Up is consistent with the long term
Supreme Court trend post-Park 'N Fly to progressively restrict
trademark rights. It appears that the Supreme Court gave with the hand
called Park 'N Fly and has taken back with the hand called KP
Permanent Make-Up. The Court ought to be intellectually honest and
expressly overrule Park 'N Fly.
The effect of this jurisprudence will be a far more restrictive
trademark right compared to the trademark right after Park 'N Fly.
Incontestability was one incentive to encourage people to file trademark
applications with the federal government under the Lanham Act and
produce a nationwide, searchable record.12 The United States system of
trademark registration is a voluntary one.3 Trademark rights in the
United States inure to the user of the mark upon use of a mark, not upon
registration of the mark.14 The primary objective of incontestability in
1947, when the Lanham Act was passed, was to encourage entities to
register their trademarks.5 Maintaining incentives to registration is a
1o See Park "NFly, 469 U.S. 189.
1 See KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. 111.
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2012) ("Subject to the conditions above specified in this
section, the incontestable right with reference to a mark registered under this chapter
shall apply to a mark registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February
20, 1905, upon the filing of the required affidavit ....").
13 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2012) ("The owner of a trademark used in commerce
may request registration of its trademark on the principal register .... ").
14 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) ("[The trademark right]
requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It is simply founded
on priority of appropriation.").
15 S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946) ("Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of
quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good reputation which excellence
continued...
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principal concern when attempting to maintain a healthy trademark
registration system that gives notice to all as to specific claims to
trademarks and the scope of those trademarks. 16 As trademark
registration has become an ingrained notion in the protection of
trademarks in America, it is arguable that such incentives are no longer
needed.
Most importantly, this means that all of the people who argued after
Park 'N Fly and after the Lanham Act took effect that the
incontestability provisions meant trademarks were subject to property
ownership were simply wrong.7
When KP Permanent Make-Up overruled, sub silentio, the Park 'N
Fly decision and all that it stood for, the trademark registration system
was undermined but, at the same time, the Supreme Court minimized
and clarified the scope of the trademark right. It is quite clear that the
current Supreme Court is uncomfortable with the broad trademark right
the Court created in 1993 with Park 'NFly and that the Court today sees
the trademark right much more narrowly than the Court did in 1993.
This is an appropriate redrawing of the scope of the trademark right.
In a time when the trademark right has grown to the point that
"trademark bullying" becomes possible, attempts to constrain
trademark bullying will have a positive effect on small and medium
sized business entities. 18 Of course, the Court has to walk a fine
balance. Although Park 'N Fly drew the scope of the trademark right
too broadly, the Court must be cognizant of a trademark right which is
too narrowly construed. A trademark right that is drawn too narrowly
will stifle economic competition and stifle the United States'
economy. 19 It appears that with KP Permanent Make-Up and its
progeny, the Court is finding its center. This is good and appropriate,
creates. To protect trade-marks... is to protect the public from deceit, [and] to foster
fair competition .... This is the end to which this bill is directed.").
16 See In the Matter of Certain Alkaline Batteries, Inv. No. 337-TA-165, USITC
Pub. 1616 (Nov. 1984) ("If there was no return from having a recognizable trademark,
companies would have no incentive to develop trademarks, and without trademarks
that allowed customers to recognize manufacturers and reward their quality with
continued purchases, manufacturers would have no incentive to develop quality
goods.").
17 S. REP. No. 1333-79, at 3-4 (1946) ("There is no essential difference between
trade-mark infringement and what is loosely called unfair competition.").
18 See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion Revisited, 14 CHI. -KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 217 (2015) (demonstrating that 5.5 % of all reported cases are likely trademark
bullying cases). Trademark bullying is the use of a non-famous mark to attempt o
enforce trademark rights against a non-competitor.
19 S. REP. No. 1333-79, at 3 (1946) ("[P]rotecting trade-marks and making
infringement and piracy unprofitable . . . can be done without any misgivings and
without the fear of fostering hateful monopolies .... ").
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and we should recognize and celebrate that fact. However, to be sure,
KP Permanent Make-Up eviscerates the concept of incontestability.
2 0
In order to sustain the outcome in KP Permanent Make- Up and this new
conception of fair use, we must accept the fact that; to do so, the Park
'N Fly doctrine and incontestability no longer plays the role in
American trademark jurisprudence that it once did. It is no longer a
strong right granted to trademark holders to encourage them to register
their marks. It now can be easily obviated by claiming that a defendant
is using a descriptive (and incontestable) mark descriptively and thereby
obviating the harsh consequences of Park 'N Fly.
II. CONTEXT
Trademark incontestability is a significant component of the
registration system in the United States.2 1 Under the Lanham Act, a
registration becomes incontestable when it has been used continuously
20 See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
21 15 U.S.C § 1065 (2012). In fact, it has been the source of an impressive body
of legal scholarship. See Maya Alexandri, The International News Quasi-Property
Paradigm and Trademark Incontestability: A Callfor Rewriting the Lanham Act, 13
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 303, 373 (2000) ("The consumptive function of trademarks
pushes trademarks toward full-fledged property and favors incontestability."); Maury
Audet, Functionality Unanimously Trumps Incontestability after Trademark Law
Treaty Act and Wilhelm Pudenz v. Littlefuse, Inc.: Next Replace Misnomer
"Incontestable" with "Conclusive, " 40 IDEA 473, 492 (2000) ("[W]ithout a
functionality defense, upholding a trademark with functional features because of the
mark's incontestable status would amount to an unconstitutional extension of the
patent clause."); Joni Borzcik, Trademark Rights and Their Implementation:
Cancellation of Generic Incontestable Marks, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 185, 185
(2010) ("The Lanham Act invites petitions 'at any time' to cancel the registration of
marks that have become 'generic.' 'At any time' applies to marks that the Act
acknowledges as 'incontestable."'); Vishal Budhwa, Incontestability: The Mark as
Property, Trademarks, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 164, 167 (2000) (coming to the
mistaken conclusion that incontestability makes trademarks themselves subject to
property protection); Bradley Haas, Trademark Protection and Acquiring the Status
of Incontestability, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 159, 163 (1998) ("[A] registrant
would be foolish-and the registrant's trademark attorney at risk for malpractice-not
to comply with the requirements and takes the steps necessary toward acquiring
incontestability for a registered mark."); Jason K. Levine, Contesting the
Incontestable: Reforming Trademark's Descriptive Mark Protection Scheme, 41
GoNz. L. REV. 29, 79 (2006) ("[P]rotecting descriptive marks in their current fashion
is anti-competitive .... Furthermore, the evidence that descriptive marks are not
needed for success today is all around us ...."); Suman Naresh, Incontestability and
Rights in Descriptive Trademarks, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 953, 991-92 (1986)
("[I]ncontestability provisions of the Lanham Act permit a seller to monopolize a
descriptive trademark ... [and] increase the incentive for sellers to choose descriptive
marks for their goods .... ).
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for five years or in connection with the goods or services named in the
Identification of Goods and Services and the Registrant files a Section
15 Affidavit with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO).22 Although technically not "incontestable" in the sense that
reasons to contest the mark remain even after five years of continuous
use, one very important reason to object to a registration is
extinguished. 23 That is, once incontestable, the otherwise valid
challenge to a registered trademark that the mark is or has become
merely descriptive is eliminated.24
22 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2012).
23 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012) (detailing that trademark registration is subject to
cancellation "[a]t any time if the registered mark becomes the generic name for the
goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is registered, or is functional, or
has been abandoned, or its registration was obtained fraudulently .... ).
24 Generally, one can contest a trademark as merely descriptive under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(e); however, the only defenses available to oppose an incontestable registration
include:
That the registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was obtained
fraudulently; or
That the mark has been abandoned by the registrant; or
That the registered mark is being used by or with the permission of the registrant
or a person in privity with the registrant, so as to misrepresent he source of the goods
or services on or in connection with which the mark is used; or
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use,
otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of the
individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services
of such party, or their geographic origin; or
That the mark whose use by a party is charged as an infringement was adopted
without knowledge of the registrant's prior use and has been continuously used by
such party or those in privity with him from a date prior to (A) the date of constructive
notice of the mark established pursuant to section 1057(c) of this title, (B) the
registration of the mark under this chapter if the application for registration is filed
before the effective date of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, or (C)
publication of the registered mark under subsection (c) of section 1062 of this title:
Provided, however, that this defense or defect shall apply only for the area in which
such continuous prior use is proved; or
That the mark whose use is charged as an infringement was registered and used
prior to the registration under this chapter or publication under subsection (c) of
subsection 1062 of this title of the registered mark of the registrant, and not
abandoned: Provided, however, that this defense or defect shall apply only for the area
in which the mark was used prior to such registration or such publication of the
registrant's mark; or
That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the United
States; or
That the mark is functional; or
That equitable principles, including laches, estoppel, and acquiescence, are
applicable.
continued...
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Using a very simple filing procedure with the USPTO that does not
get the attention of an Examiner, but only a filing clerk, a holder of a
subsisting registration can file a Section 15 Affidavit.25 This affidavit
is reviewed for form only, not substance.26 On this form, the registrant
claims that it has been using the mark in commerce for five years and it
has done so continuously.27 If signed by the proper authority of the
registrant, is appropriately dated, and other simple and technical
formalities are followed, it is "acknowledged" by the USPTO.28 Once
it is accepted, the trademark registration is deemed to be incontestable.29
Originally, this was seen as an important incentive to encourage
trademark holders to register their trademarks with the USPTO. 30
Unless registration occurred, searching to determine availability and
priority on a national basis was frustrated.31 As registration proceeded
voluntarily in the United States,3 2 Congress felt that it needed to provide
incentives to encourage registration. 3 Today, of course, it is all
computerized; but in 1947, the effective date of the Lanham Act,
searching was all done manually. Therefore, it was essential to a
functioning national trademark system to have one location to search
15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(1)-(9) (2012) (emphasis in original). Additionally, unrelated
reasons to cancel an incontestable registration are provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3),
(4), and (5). Most important of these reasons is that the mark becomes generic.
25 TMEP § 1065 (8th ed. July 2015) ("the USPTO reviews the affidavit or
declaration to determine whether it is consistent with the requirements of the statute
and rules").
26 TMEP § 1065 (8th ed. July2015).
27 15 U.S.C. § 1065(3) (2012).
28 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2012) ("The Director shall notify any registrant who files the
above-prescribed affidavit of the filing thereof.").
29 TMEP § 1065 (8th ed. July2015).
30 See Park "NFly, 469 U.S. at 198; David W. Barnes & Teresa A. Laky, Classic
Fair Use of Trademarks: Confusion About Defenses, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 833, 881 (2003).
31 Jon R. Cavicchi, Trademark Searching Tools and Strategies: Questions for the
New Millennium, 46 IDEA 649, 651 (2006) (highlighting Glenn A. Gundersen's
observation that "[in] the not-too-distant past, conducting a search to determine the
availability of a proposed trademark was a relatively simple process. Trademark
lawyers relied for the most part on outside professional search organizations, which
provided reports focusing primarily on marks registered with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office ... ").
32 15 U.S. C. § 1051(a)(1) (2012) ("The owner of a trademark used in commerce
may request registration of its trademark on the principal register .... ) (emphasis
added).
33 See Hearing on H.R. 82 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Patents, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1944) (testimony of Daphne Robert, ABA Committee on Trade
Mark Legislation) ("This bill will bring about ... an incentive to register because it
provides in section 15 ... an incontestable right.").
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for competing trademarks. The Principal Register of the USPTO,34
where all trademarks become registered and listed, serves as that one
point for searching purposes, but it is only effective if holders of
trademarks register their rights with the USPTO. 3 Without
registration, and prior to the advent of computer search engines such as
Google, Bing, Yahoo, etc., effective searching was nearly impossible.
Therefore, Congress provided the incentive of incontestability to
encourage compliance in a voluntary system.
36
Perhaps the most important incentive is in the form of a statutory
presumption. Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act states as follows:
To the extent that the right to use the registered mark
has become incontestable under section 15, the
registration shall be conclusive evidence of the validity
of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark,
of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in
commerce. 
37
Under Section 33(a), a trademark registration prior to becoming
incontestable is merely "prima facie" evidence of the validity of the
trademark.38 Under Section 33(b), this primafacie evidence language
becomes "conclusive evidence" of the validity of the registration once
34 TMEP § 801.02 (8th ed. July 2015) ("When a mark has been registered on the
Principal Register, the mark is entitled to all the rights provided by the [Lanham]
Act.").
35 Id.
36 See Hearing on H.R. 82, supra note 33, at 128 (statement of Earl H. Thomson)
("[A] trade-mark adopter, when he has registered his trade-mark, wants to feel that
after a period of time, certainly he will know that he owns that trade-mark and can
maintain his right."); Sylvester J. Liddy, The Lanham Act-An Analysis, 37
TRADEMARK REP. 87, 94 (1947) (quoting Casper W. Ooms, the Commissioner of
Patents, who said that incontestability would give businesses the "assurance that [their
marks] will not forever remain an object of attack" by other businesses using similar
marks at the Annual Meeting of the A.N.A. at Atlantic City on September 30, 1946);
Casper W. Ooms & George E. Frost, Incontestability, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
220, 232-33 (1949); F.T. Alexandra Mahaney, Comment, Incontestability; The Park
'N Fly Decision, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1149, 1186 (1986) (recognizing that
incontestability provides security and stability for mark owners).
37 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(2012).
38 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012) ("[A] mark registered on the principal register
provided by this chapter . . . shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of
the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark... but shall
not preclude another person from proving any legal or equitable defense or defect...
which might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered.").
2015]
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incontestable.39 Historically, this statutory presumption has been given
weight (but in inconsistent amounts) by lower courts when adjudicating
incontestable trademarks.4"
KP Permanent Make-Up acts to undermine this statutory
presumption. It does this by focusing on a part of Section 33. 41 In
Section 33(b)(4), the Lanham Act states as follows:
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to
be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of
the party's individual name in his own business, or of the
individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or
of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly
and in good faith only to describe the goods or services
of such party, or their geographic origin .... 42
This language has been interpreted as standing for the notion of "fair
use" in trademark law.43 Of course, fair use is a term of art in copyright
law where some otherwise infringing uses are forgiven.44 Fair use in
copyright doctrine began long before its inclusion into the Copyright
Act of 1976.45 Fair use in copyright law is an affirmative defense that
only arises after the plaintiff makes a convincing showing in his case-
in-chief that an infringement has occurred.46 The defense then argues
that the infringing conduct should be forgiven because there has been
some market failure and the defendant could not obtain a license to use
the work even if it wanted to.
47
39 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2012) ("To the extent that the right to use the registered
mark has become incontestable under section 1065 of this title, the registration shall
be conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of
the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive
right to use the registered mark .....
41 See Port, supra note 5.
41 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 118.
42 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012).
43 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 121.
44 Reproduction of copyrighted works for select purposes such as commentary,
news, scholarship, or research, is fair use and not an infringement of copyright. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
45 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1733, at 7 (1976).
46 Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 135,
168 (2011) (the Supreme Court in Harper claimed that the fair use was an affirmative
defense and it has been treated as such by subsequent courts but there is no legislative
history that supports that conclusion).
47 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2014) (Fair use includes consideration of, "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."). But cf, Lenz v.
Universal Music Corp., Nos. 13-16106, 13-16107, 2015 WL 5315388 (9th Cir. Sept.
14, 2015) (holding that copyright fair use in the context of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act's take down procedures is a proscriptive right).
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It is interesting and, frankly, quite troubling that fair use under KP
Permanent Make-Up is not an affirmative defense but an absolute
defense. We will return to this point below.
The Lanham Act was a codification statute.48 This is significant
because the Lanham Act itself, in the Legislative History, says that the
Lanham Act is a codification of the common law and creates no new
rights.49 However, one searches state trademark law prior to 1947 in
vain to find a state with an existing incontestability provision in their
state law prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act.50 In fact, Congress
borrowed the notion of incontestability from the British and imposed it
onto the American trademark system and labeled it part of the common
law of trademarks in 1947.51 The fact is that incontestability was seen
as so necessary to encourage a healthy registration system that Congress
reached to the United Kingdom and applied it to the Lanham Act 52 and,
at the same time, claimed that the Lanham Act was a codification of the
Common Law.53 This is accurate if we presume that by "common law"
we include judge made law in the United States and the laws of the
United Kingdom, another common law jurisdiction. This was done
seamlessly at the time and no one then or now has challenged whose
"common law" we were codifying with the Lanham Act.
That is, incontestability was an integral part of making a voluntary
trademark registration system work. If there were not incentives to
registration, it is likely that the Lanham Act would have been ignored
just like the Trademark Act of 1905.
III. PARK 'N FLY V. DOLLAR PARK AND FLY
Until the Supreme Court released its opinion in the Park 'NFly case
41 S. REP. No. 1333-79, at 4-5 (1946) ("There are many statutes dealing with
trade-marks which are widely scattered.... It seems desirable to collect these various
statutes and have them in a single enactment . . . This bill effects this necessary
codification and coordination.").
49 S. REP. No. 1333-79, at 5 (1946) ("The Federal Trade-Mark Act has been in
operation for over 40 years .... The present bill preserves the things which have
demonstrated their usefulness.").
50 In 1946, prior to effectuation of the Lanham Act, scholars noted that
incontestability endowed new administration of law on trade-marks, and a deniable
distinction between incontestability and exclusive property rights. Rudolph Callmann,
The New Trade-Mark Act of July 5, 1946, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 929, 940-41 (1946).
51 Trade Marks Registration Act 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 91, § 3 (Eng., Scot., &
Ir.). Whether that was an appropriate or legitimate legislative action is beyond the
scope of this article.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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in 1985,54 there was much uncertainty about what incontestability in the
Lanham Act actually meant.55 The heading in Section 33(b) for the
section regarding incontestability is labeled as follows:
"Incontestability; defenses." 56 That is, on the very surface of the
Lanham Act, it appears that Section 33(b) will provide a list of defenses
one might assert when one's trademark registration is challenged, but it
is not clear when those rights ought to be asserted. Would it be
appropriate to assert those rights in an infringement setting of an
incontestable mark57 or are these exclusively defenses to a claim that
the trademark is invalid and should be either canceled or opposed before
the USPTO?
58
At the same time, some claimed that the word "defenses" in the
Lanham Act did not mean defenses at all or, at least, it was not limiting
language in any way.59 Headings as statutory language, are arguably
not part of the Lanham Act at all or certainly not controlling. 60
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court there held that one may not
use an incontestable registration in an offensive manner.61 In effect, the
Ninth Circuit agreed that the title of "defenses" meant that Section 33(b)
could only be used in a defensive manner against challenges of a
trademark registration's validity.
62
In what certainly proved to be incontestability's high water mark,
the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit and held that, in fact, a
54 Park "NFly, 469 U.S. 189 (holding that the incontestable status of a trademark
can be used offensively and cannot be contested on the descriptive nature of the mark).
55 See Ooms & Frost, supra note 36, at 232. In 1949, three years before an
incontestability case for a descriptive mark could be heard, courts both invalidated
registration of descriptive marks and gave little weight to presuming validity of
trademarks based on registration.
56 15 U.S.C § 1115(b) (2012).
51 Id. Section 1115 does not endorse or prevent offensive use of incontestable
registrations. ("To the extent... the registered mark has become incontestable.., the
registration shall be conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark ....
Such conclusive evidence of the right to use the registered mark shall be subject to
proof of infringement").
58 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 1982).
59 Park "NFly, 469 U.S. at 196 (commenting that the Lanham Act does not make
an offensive/defensive distinction in the use of incontestable marks).
60 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457, 482 (2001) (stating that the
interpretive role of a statute title may only be used to clarify an ambiguous word or
phrase, and that the interpretive role of a title can be eliminated).
61 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1983)
("[A] registrant can use the incontestable status of its mark defensively, as a
shield.. .but not offensively, as a sword to enjoin another's use.").
62 Id. (The court here decided an incontestable mark should not be used
offensively, as the mark "would not be entitled to continued registration but for its
incontestable status.").
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descriptive but incontestable trademark registration could be the
foundation of an enforcement action.63 That is, without incontestability,
all enforceable trademarks need to have secondary meaning or be
inherently distinctive.64 Merely descriptive marks are not trademarks at
all and are unenforceable.65 Incontestability has the effect of saving
descriptive marks. 66 In Justice O'Connor's terms, it can be used
"offensively" as well as "defensively.,67
In so doing, Justice O'Connor elevated the status of incontestability
from a mere administrative procedure within the USPTO to respond to
motions to cancel or oppose a registration, to a right in an Article III
style court that could be used as the sole basis of an enforcement
action.68 Most interestingly, the trademark at issue in the Park 'N Fly
case was "PARK 'N FLY" for airport shuttle services giving rides to
passengers to and from their cars and the airport.69 That is, it was a
remarkably descriptive mark. Never mind that absolute fact, Justice
O'Connor opined, the mark was incontestable and, as such, reached a
new level of significance under the Lanham Act.y°
As stated above, the Lanham Act is a statute that codified the
common law of trademarks. 71 The Lanham Act is constitutional
because it codifies the common law and does not grant new rights.
7 2
Yet, clearly, here Justice O'Connor's opinion in Park 'N Fly operates
to create new rights in trademark registration holders of descriptive
marks.7 3 With incontestability, a descriptive mark is elevated from the
dust bin of trademark jurisprudence to an enforceable right that can be
commodified and enforced. 74 This is a very good outcome for a
registrant who is smart enough to file a simple Section 15 Affidavit with
the USPTO.
Although the opinion was authored by Justice O'Connor, Chief
Justice Burger, and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist joined her.y5 Only Justice Stevens dissented.y
63 Park NFly, 469 U.S. at 196 ("The statute nowhere distinguishes between a
registrant's offensive and defensive use of an incontestable mark.").
64 Id. at 194.
65 
Id. at 193-94.
66 Id. at 196.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 205.
69 Id. at 191.
70 Id. at 196 (an incontestable mark may be used to enjoin infringement by others).
71 See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 5 (1946).
72 Id.
73 Park "NFly, 469 U.S. at 205.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 190.
76 Id.
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens pointed out the obvious. Justice
Stevens claimed that the mark "PARK 'N FLY" was descriptive and
therefore was not subject to statutory protection.77 To bolster his claim,
Justice Stevens cited extensively from the legislative history of the
Lanham Act.78 Justice Stevens quoted a lengthy statement by Dr. Karl
Pohl 71 who claimed that it would be extremely difficult to get
descriptive marks registered by the USPTO.80 In fact, he stated on the
record as follows:
They have very carefully circumscribed procedure
for getting these [descriptive] marks on the register. It
will by no means be easy, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen
of the committee, it will be exceedingly difficult to get
these descriptive words on the register. The Patent
Office will, in the first place, reject them, and you will
have to submit a substantial body of evidence that these
words by long-continued usage, have acquired a
secondary meaning, and by that long-continued usage
have acquired that special status which entitles them to
be protected in their secondary meaning sense.
81
Justice Stevens is clearly perturbed by these representations
because, even though Dr. Pohl claimed it would be nearly impossible to
register a descriptive mark, in Park 'N Fly, the justices were facing a
descriptive mark without secondary meaning. 82 In fact, Justice Stevens
points out, Dr. Pohl's testimony was "misleading" as the "PARK 'N
FLY" mark likely issued with no showing of objective secondary
meaning to the USPTO. 83  The registration then subsisted for the
requisite five years and the result was an incontestable registration that,
in the opinion of the majority, could now be used offensively to enjoin
77Id. at 207 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating, Park 'N Fly is at best merely
descriptive... [and] the registration plainly violated the Act.).
78 Id. at 207.
7 Dr. Karl Pohl was a mere member of the precursor to the International
Trademark Association. Then and now it strongly advocates for trademark holders.
80 Park N Fly, 469 U.S. at 210-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 211.
83 Dr. Pohl's testimony indicates that to achieve incontestability, a substantial
body of evidence must show the term has acquired secondary meaning, and therefore
is entitled to protection. However, Justice Stevens points out Dr. Pohl's remarks are
misleading, "for the 'Park N' Fly' mark issued without any evidence of secondary
meaning," regardless that Congress did not intend "that incontestability should
preserve a merely descriptive trademark from challenge when the statutory procedure
for establishing secondary meaning was not followed and when the record still
contains no evidence that the mark has ever acquired a secondary meaning." Id.
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subsequent uses of the same or similar marks on the same or similar
products.84
This is a very clear judicial expansion of the trademark right using
a statute that was meant to codify the common law of trademarks, not
grant new rights, and ignores the existing legislative history.
IV. BETWEEN PARK 'N FLY IN 1984 AND KP PERMANENT MAKE-UP
IN 2004
In the intervening 20 years between Park 'NFly and KP Permanent
Make-Up, there were several significant trademark cases adjudicated by
the Supreme Court. When looking at these numerous cases together, it
becomes apparent that the Supreme Court went through a period of
expanding trademark rights and has since contracted trademark rights.
Park 'N Fly and KP Permanent Makeup operate as bookends to this
trend by the Court. Park 'NFly acted to vastly expand trademark rights
via the incontestability doctrine and KP Permanent Make-Up operated
to drastically constrict trademark rights. 5
KP Permanent Make-Up is appropriately most often cited for the
proposition that when a descriptive mark is used descriptively, this
amounts to the fair use of a trademark;86 however, it is important to
realize that, at bottom, the mark in KP Permanent Make-Up was an
incontestable registration.87 If incontestability was given the weight
that Park 'N Fly seems to dictate, Park 'N Fly should teach away from
the final result reached in KP Permanent Make-Up. Stated another way,
with Park 'N Fly as Supreme Court precedent, the Court in KP
Permanent Make- Up should have reached a different result than it did.
If the mark at issue in KP Permanent Make-Up was given the weight
that Park 'N Fly dictates, it seems that the Court should have reached a
different result regarding the mark's validity in KP Permanent Makeup.
Perhaps the Court would have still reached the same result that
Lasting's mark infringed KP Permanent Make-Up's mark, but if Park
'NFly weight was given to it, it would have found KP Permanent Make-
84 Id. at 205 (O'Connor, J., majority) ("[T]he holder of a registered mark mayrely
on incontestability to enjoin infringement and that such an action may not be defended
on the ground that the mark is merely descriptive.").
85 Compare Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205
(1985) with KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
124 (2004).
86 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 122 ("This right to describe is the reason
that descriptive terms qualify for registration as trademarks only after taking on
secondary meaning ....").
87 Lasting registered the trademark "Micro Colors" in 1993, which achieved
incontestable status in 1999. Id. at 115.
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Up's mark valid and subsisting rather than dismissing it without
reaching an infringement analysis.
By dismissing KP Permanent Makeup's mark as unenforceable
under the fair use doctrine, the Court, as a matter of law, significantly
circumscribed KP Permanent Make-Up's mark and prevented them
from reaching a jury verdict on confusion.88 It is conceivable that, in
the KP Permanent Make-Up case, if a jury was asked to balance all
appropriate infringement factors, a reasonable jury could have found
that KP Permanent Make-Up's mark was infringed by Lasting.89 When
the Court interrupted this with its finding that KP Permanent Make-Up's
mark, as a matter of law, was unenforceable, the Court curtailed KP
Permanent Make-Up's trademark rights to a significant degree.9" From
a Court that pledged to not be an activist Court,9" this is a clear case of
judicial activism making law, rather than applying law.
This begs the question of how we got to this point. In order to




Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc. has the dubious
distinction of being one of the Court's, as of yet, uncorrected recent
cases regarding trademark law. 9 Uncorrected in the sense that it
drastically expanded trademark protection and, unlike others, no
subsequent Supreme Court opinion has come along to curtail what was
granted here. Qualitex expands trademark rights to non-traditional
trademarks94 and it has not yet been curtailed or restricted.
Qualitex expanded the notion oftrademark jurisprudence. InJustice
Breyer's opinion for a unanimous Court, he claimed that the word "any"
in the statute meant "any.",9 5 This is remarkable because so many times
88 Id. at 124.
89 KP Permanent Make-Up was tried in the 9th Circuit, which applied the
Sleekcrafi factors for trademark infringement. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599
F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods.,
353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
90 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 124.
91 A. E. Dick Howard, Now We Are Six: The Emerging Roberts Court, 98 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 1, 4 (2012).
92 For a more thorough treatment of this issue in the context of a Supreme Court
constricting trademark jurisprudence, see David S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court
and Trademark Law in the New Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659 (2004).
93 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
9' Id. at 161 (stating color alone can operate as a trademark if it identifies source).
95 "[T]he language 'any word, name symbol, or device' . .. had come to include
color." Id. at 172.
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the Court has defined "any" (or synonymous terms) as meaning
something other than "any."' 96 Justice Breyer relied on the specific
language of the Lanham Act to say that a trademark consisted of any
word, name, symbol or device that operated to identify the source or
origin of some good or service.97 As such, there was no technical reason
why color alone could not be the appropriate subject of trademark
protection.98 The Court, therefore, held that a green gold press pad used
in the laundry business acted to identify the source of the press pads.99
The Court clearly said that this holding applied to just the color of the
product, not the product itself 00
Justice Breyer wrote as follows: "We conclude that, sometimes, a
color will meet ordinary legal trademark requirements. And, when it
does so, no special legal rule prevents color alone from serving as a
trademark."'
Justice Breyer's opinion is relied on by the USPTO when examining
trade dress marks for registration for the proposition that trade dress
(specifically in the form of color) must contain secondary meaning to
be registered.10 2 If Justice Thomas is correct and all trademark doctrine
should apply to trade dress seamlessly, 1 03 it would be possible to have
inherently distinctive trade dress and therefore protect appellations of
source like color devoid of secondary meaning. Justice Breyer clearly
disagreed with this view because he said that a "product's color is unlike
'fanciful,' 'arbitrary,' or 'suggestive' words or designs, which almost
automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand."10 4 One ponders
what Justice Breyer meant by "almost automatically" operates as a
trademark as that is the definition of the inherently distinctive
96 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (determining
that the Clean Air Act usage of "'any air pollutant' ... encompasses only pollutants
emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly regulated at the statutory
thresholds, and to exclude those atypical pollutants .... ).
9' Justice Breyer asserts that when Congress reenacted the terms "word, name,
symbol, or device" the topic of color was open for reevaluation by the courts against
previous precedent restricting the use of color alone as a trademark. See Qualitex, 514
U.S. at 173.
98 See id.
99 Id. at 166.
100 Id. at 161.
101 Id.
102 See generally TMEP § 1202.02 (July 2015) (citing and discussing Qualitex in
the context of color and the registration of trade dress).
103 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 787 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("A particular trade dress, then, is now considered as fully capable as a
particular trademark of serving as a 'representation or designation' of source under §
43(a) [of the Lanham Act].").
104 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162-63 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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trademarks from which he was distinguishing.105 That is, an inherently
distinctive trademark operates to identify source inherently or
automatically without a showing of secondary meaning. 106 It is
certainly not clear what he meant by "almost automatically." It implies
that there is some other way to obtain trademark status for an identifier
of source other than by characterizing the mark as inherently distinctive
or by showing secondary meaning.
Qualitex did not clarify this other than to make the normative
pronouncement hat color was not like inherently distinctive marks. 107
Silence allowed litigants to fill the void and so people further claimed
that Qualitex stood for the notion that trademark rights were even
further expanded with the Qualitex case.108 Qualitex proved to be a
significant moment for nontraditional trademarks as the market for
trademarks came to believe that "any" really meant "any" and the
Supreme Court was going to back this up.109 In fact, it became so
significant that in the forty-eight years prior to Qualitex, nontraditional
trademarks were the subject of only ninety-three trademark applications
to the USPTO. 110 Between 1995 and 2011 (sixteen years),
nontraditional trademarks were the subject of 688 trademark
applications.111 Qualitex had a major impact on an entity's claims for
non-traditional trademarks. After Qualitex, people and corporations
began to claim things such as the motion of a spray of water ejected out
of the back of a personal watercraft,'1 12 or the vertically opening motion
115 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162. Justice Breyer commented that "if trademark law
permits a descriptive word with secondary meaning to act as a mark, why would it not
permit color, under similar circumstance, to do the same?" Id. at 163.
106 See id. at 163 (emphasis added) (arguing that a color can identify a source of
products similar to descriptive words).
107 See id. at 162-63. Oddly, Justice Breyer even cites Taco Cabana for this
proposition. It is unclear how Taco Cabana supports this proposition and Justice
Breyer offers none.
108 In Qualitex, the Court decided that colors that acquired secondary meaning
served as a symbol to identify a product and therefore colors are eligible for trademark
protection. Id. at 166. This led to an amazing increase in interest in "non-traditional
trademarks" and spurred the growth of registration and claiming such marks. See
generally Kenneth L. Port, On Nontraditional Trademarks, 38 N. KY. L. REv. 1
(2011).
109 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 172 (Congress, having retained "the language 'any word,
name, symbol, or device,' 15 U.S.C. § 1127," strongly suggests that the statute "had
come to include color.").
110 Port, supra note 108, at 2-3.
111 Id. at 3.
112 U.S. Patent No. 1,946,170 (filed Jan. 9, 1996) ("The mark is comprised of a
three dimensional spray of water issuing from the rear of a jet propelled watercraft and
is generated during the operation of the watercraft.").
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of an automobile car door."'3 Even a hologram defined as follows was
claimed:
The mark consists of a hologram device which is
applied to the goods, trading cards. The mark is discrete
from and does not constitute a part of the subject matter
of the trading card. Neither the size nor the shape of the
hologram device, nor any content which may be
represented within the hologram device, nor the
positioning of the hologram device on the trading card
are claimed as features of the mark." 4
Qualitex is now cited worldwide for the proposition that the scope
of trademarks in many countries should be expanded.1 5 It is safe to say
that Qualitex has left a significant and "lasting impression" 116
worldwide regarding what the appropriate scope of trademark
protection ought to be. However, did Justice Breyer in Qualitex mean
to be so expansive? To do so, he had to stretch and re-envision the
language of the Lanham Act. To conclude that color and any
nontraditional trademark is within the purview of the Lanham Act, it is
required that we accept Justice Breyer's conceptualization of the terms
"symbol or device." 117 However, as I have pointed out elsewhere,1 '
the original concept of "symbol or device" appears to be referring to
design trademarks as used, for example, as part of an entity's signage,
not the spray that emanates from the rear of a personal water craft that
bears the appellation of source of Jet Ski®. 1 19
Justice Breyer could have stopped at the point where he found that
Qualitex's press pads had acquired secondary meaning and, therefore,
amounted to a protectable trademark, but he did not.120 Justice Breyer
takes on the previous objections to finding color alone as appropriate
subject matter and even says that he apparently looked and could not
"find in the basic objectives of trademark law any obvious theoretical
113 AUTOMOBILE LAMBORGHINI HOLDING S.P.A., Registration No.
2,793,439 ("The mark consists of the unique motion in which the door of a vehicle is
opened. The doors move parallel to the body of the vehicle but are gradually raised
above the vehicle to a parallel position.").
114 In re The Upper Deck Co., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1688, 1689 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
115 See Glenda Labadie-Jackson, Through the Looking Hole of the Multi-Sensory
Trademark Rainbow: Trademark Protection of Color Per Se Across Jurisdictions: The
United States, Spain and the European Union, 7 RiCH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 91, 106
(2008) (omitting the word "device" from the quoted section of the Lanham Act).
116 Pun intended.
11' Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1995).
118 Port, supra note 108, at 2.
119 Id.
120 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 159.
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objection to the use of color alone as a trademark."'121 According to
Qualitex, color alone is not necessarily functional; 122 there are not
normatively objectionable reasons to exclude color alone as a trademark
based on "shade confusion,,123 and there are no reasons based on "color
depletion" to absolutely exclude color alone as possible subject matter
of trademarks. 
124
Therefore, according to Qualitex, color alone "sometimes"
(presumably only when secondary meaning can be demonstrated) can
act as a trademark.125 Of course, this has led applicants to presume that
color alone "always" acts to identify source and, based on the notion
that this is reliant on the words "symbol or device" that appear in the
Lanham Act, has led applicants to claim that this applies seamlessly to
all nontraditional trademarks no matter where their imaginations might
lead us. 
126
121 Id. at 163.
122 While color often has functional aspects, it can also meet requirements of a
trademark and act as a symbol to distinguish goods. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165. But
see TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (holding the
exact opposite proposition that a functional mark never operates to identify source).
Once again, the Supreme Court's pronouncements on a basic trademark doctrine are
not consistent.
123 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 167 (noting that courts frequently are charged with
making decisions that are the rhetorical equivalent of "shade confusion" arguments
and succeed in making fine distinctions nevertheless).
124 Id. at 169 (An occasional problem should not lead to blanket prohibitions.
"Moreover . . . the trademark doctrine of 'functionality' normally would seem
available to prevent the anticompetitive consequences .....
125 Id. at 174.
126 In fact, one applicant was lead to believe that even his own DNA sequence
was the appropriate subject matter of trademarks. Frank Ogden, or Dr. Tomorrow,
filed this trademark in 2004. His trademark application claimed its identification of
goods as follows: "DNA GENE SEQUENCE TO PRODUCT [sic] FRANK OGDEN
OR OTHER PROSPECTIVE HUMANS, CLONES, SURVIVAL MACHINES, OR
FUTURISTIC ANIMALS THAT ARE USED TO CREATE IDEAS." U.S. Patent
Serial No. 76,016,924 (filed Apr. 3, 2000) (abandoned Jan. 21, 2002). Frank Ogden
maintains a website at http://www.drtomorrow.com. Mr. Ogden's registered
trademark for DR. TOMORROW was cancelled in 2004. See U.S. Patent Serial No.
74,274,318 (filed May 11, 1992) (cancelled June 12, 2004). When asked, Mr. Ogden
responded that the reason he attempted to register his own DNA sequence was because
"I THOUGHT THAT JUST THE LOOKING AT A PERSON AND BE WILLING
TO PENETRATE THEIR DNA WOULD REMOVE A LOT OF CONTROL OVER
ANY TAXPAYER. I WANTED TO GET THERE BEFORE SOME BUREAUCRAT
GOT A BILL PASSED FOR THAT CONTROL." E-mail from Frank Ogden to author
(July 29, 2009) (on file with author) (capital letters from original).
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B. Taco Cabana
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., the Supreme Court
continued to expand trademark rights.1 27 Taco Cabana stands for the
proposition that trade dress can be inherently distinctive and therefore,
need not have secondary meaning.1 28 As Justice Stevens summarized
the issue before the Court in Taco Cabana: "[S]econdary meaning is not
required to establish a trade dress violation under § 43(a) once inherent
distinctiveness has been established." 
1 29
The Court was so enamored with the trade dress at issue in Taco
Cabana that it even upheld a specific jury finding that the mark lacked
secondary meaning and that the trade dress was inherently distinctive
and, therefore, a protectable trademark. 130
The Court did so even though the trade dress at issue was not the
subject of a trademark registration. 131 Therefore, the various statutory
presumptions, like incontestability, would not apply to the Taco Cabana
mark. 132
The trade dress at issue in Taco Cabana is extremely challenging to
define. The Court said that the mark consisted of the "overall business
impression. "133 In gratuitous language describing the mark, the Court
adopted the lower court's definition of the mark as follows:
[A] festive eating atmosphere having interior dining
and patio areas decorated with artifacts, bright colors,
paintings and murals. The patio includes interior and
exterior areas with the interior patio capable of being
sealed off from the outside patio by overhead garage
doors. The stepped exterior of the building is a festive
127 Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 770 (noting that the inherently distinctive trade dress
is protectable under the Lanham Act without evidence of secondary meaning.).
128 Id. at 784.
129 Id. at 775-76 ("[Plrotecting an inherently distinctive trade dress from its
inception may be critical to new entrants to the market and that withholding protection
until secondary meaning has been established would be contrary to ... the Lanham
Act.... We agree with the Court of Appeals that proof of secondary meaning is not
required .. where the trade dress at issue is inherently distinctive .... ").
130 Id. at 776 (despite being unregistered, Taco Cabana had an inherently
distinctive trade dress).
131 Id. at 768.
132 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2012) (incontestability applies only to registered marks).
133 Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 765 (agreeing with the District Court that "'trade
dress' is the total image of the business.").
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and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon
stripes. Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the
theme. 134
Accepting the notion that a "festive eating atmosphere" can be an
inherently distinctive trade dress threw the doors to trademark
protection wide open. 135 If a "festive eating atmosphere" could be
protected as one's trade dress, it is difficult to comprehend what would
fail the Court's definition of a trade dress.
Justice Thomas went so far in his concurrence to claim that the
Lanham Act itself was responsible for treating trade dress as a
trademark and, therefore, all trademark doctrine should apply to trade
dress questions seamlessly.136 Justice Thomas said as follows in Taco
Cabana:
A particular trade dress, then, is now considered as fully
capable as a particular trademark of serving as a
"representation or designation" of source under § 43(a).
As a result, the first user of an arbitrary package, like the
first user of an arbitrary word, should be entitled to the
presumption that his package represents him without
having to show that it does so in fact. This rule follows,
in my view, from the language of § 43(a), and this rule
applies under that section without regard to the rules that
apply under the sections of the Lanham Act that deal
with registration. 137
Justice White's majority opinion and both Justice Thomas' and
Justice Stevens' concurrences support the simple fact that unregistered
but inherently distinctive trade dress is protectable without secondary
meaning the same as inherently distinctive trademarks. 138 This, again,
acts to expand the notion of trademark protection. All three of these
Justices recognized the fact that there was a "consensus" among the
circuit courts to accept the trend that trademark law was expanding. 139
Of course, this "consensus" sounds like an abdication. The Supreme
Court is not bound by the circuit courts. 140 Justice Stevens' concurrence
134 Id. (citing Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th
Cir. 1991)).
135 Id.
136 Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 787 (Thomas, J., concurring).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 777-85 (Stevens, J., concurring).
140 Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and
Acoustic Separation, 45 CoNN. L. REv. 933, 964 (2013).
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reads like he is a passive pawn in this endeavor and, if the lower courts
wanted it, they should get it. If the Supreme Court found this expansion
of trademark protection, treating trade dress as if it were a trademark, to
be inappropriate, one would expect it to express its opinion, not operate
as a passive entity dictated to by the circuit courts. Justice Stevens goes
so far as to say that "stare decisis concerns persuade me to join the
Court's conclusion.... ,,1 4 1 To what Justice Stevens is referring boggles
the imagination. The Supreme Court has never shied away from telling
the circuit courts when the Court thought the circuit courts got it
wrong.1 42 Why, all of a sudden, is Justice Stevens worried about a
notion of stare decisis which is irrelevant and inappropriate?
Taco Cabana and Qualitex compete with Park 'N Fly for the high
point of broad trademark protection in the United States. The result of
this (Taco Cabana, Qualitex and Park 'N Fly) was that trademark
discourse was greatly expanded and invigorated.1 43 At this point in the
development of the Supreme Court's trademark jurisprudence, one
could have enforceable trademark rights if an Examiner was asleep at
the wheel and registered a descriptive mark and it became incontestable
through a very simple form before the USPTO or one used the
metaphorical equivalent of a "festive eating atmosphere" before anyone
else did, even if they failed to register it or intentionally think of it as
their trademark. 144
C. TrafFix
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc. begins the restrictive
period of trademark jurisprudence for the Court. 145 In TraFix, the
Court found that an expired utility patent for the feature for which trade
141 Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 784.
142 See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2017, 2115 (2013) (reversing Federal Circuit Court in part, isolated DNA is not patent
eligible as it is a product of nature, and affirming in part, cDNA cannot be isolated in
nature and is therefore patent eligible); Mayo Collaboration Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (reversing Federal Circuit Court, math
equations that express laws of nature are not themselves patent eligible as they
effectively claim the underlying laws of nature); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs.,
Inc. 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) (reversing Federal Circuit Court, where the article has
embodied the patent, patent exhaustion applies to method patents and prevents the
patent holder from invoking patent law to control post-sale use of the article).
143 Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 765 (trade dress can be inherently distinctive
without any showing secondary meaning has been acquired).
144 Id. (citing Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th
Cir. 1991)).
145 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
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dress is claimed is "strong evidence" that the feature is functional.
146
The facts of TrafFix are not difficult. Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI)
created a sign base for road side signs warning of various hazards. 147
These signs tend to tip over in the wind. 148 Some construction
companies simply use an inverted "T" design for the legs of the sign
and weigh them down with sand bags. 149 MDI's (the Respondent before
the Supreme Court but the Plaintiff below) genius was to put the legs of
these signs on springs. When the wind blew, as it most certainly would,
the sign would tilt and remain in place.15
Robert Sarkisian secured two utility patents for this dual spring sign
base design-the '696 patent151 and the '482 patent.152 In the 1970's
MDI had engaged in a "long-running intellectual property battle" with
Winn-Proof in which the court ultimately decided that Winn-Proof had
infringed MDI's patents under the doctrine of equivalents. 153 This
litigation against TrafFix followed after the patents expired and TrafFix,
a competitor of MDI, began selling sign stands with a "visible spring
mechanism that looked like MDI's.,
154
Prior to TrafFix, there had been a split in the circuit courts regarding
146 Id. at 29 (previously held utility patent for dual-spring design is strong
evidence that dual-spring features are functional, and precludes trademark protection
for the same).
147 Id. at 25.
148 Id. at 31.
149 Id. at 29 ("Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in
many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products.").
150 The dual-springs "are necessary to the operation of the device." As
documented in the patent specifications, the dual-spring design (as opposed to a
single-spring) prevents the twisting and tipping of the sign and is an "'important part
of this combination."' Id. at 30-31.
151 U.S. Patent No. 3,646,696. "Key aspects.., as defined by its claims," include:
"Generally parallel 'ground engaging members' (to provide a stable base);
Spaced apart coil springs (to prevent twisting of the sign frame);
An upstanding frame-type sign structure (to hold large advertisements); and
An initial compression between the coils of the springs (in order to prevent the
sign from fluttering in light winds)."
Brief for Respondent, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23
(2001) (No. 99-1571), 2000 WL 1521620, at *2-3.
152 U.S. Patent No. 3,662,482. "The '482 patent was a continuation-in-part of the
'696 patent and had the following key features recited in the claims:
A geometric relationship-defined mathematically in the claims as Wf(Da-
Db)<WbDbbetween the center of gravity of the sign and the length of the legs which
allowed the frame structure to bend over in high winds without the sign stand tipping
over or sliding along the ground; and
'Spring means' connected at two spaced apart locations."
Id. at *3.
153 TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 30.
154 Id. at 26.
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the weight to give an expired patent in a subsequent rade dress claim.
In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. West Bend Co., the court held that trade
dress protection is not foreclosed even when it is the subject of a
previous and expired utility patent. 155 On the other hand, Vornado Air
Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., concluded that "[w]here a
product configuration is a significant inventive component of an
invention covered by a utility patent ... it cannot receive trade dress
protection."1 56 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this
conflict.
1 57
However, the so-called split is more nuanced than Justice Kennedy
realized. There is an important difference between something disclosed
in a patent application and something claimed in a patent application. 158
Patent infringement is limited to those things expressly claimed in a
patent application. 15' Disclosures or specifications are simply
background matter that the Patent Examiner and the public needs to
know to put the invention in context and make it make sense. The
disclosure is an exchange for giving the patentee monopoly rights.
1 60
That is, the subject matter of an enforceable patent right extends
exclusively to those things claimed in the application. 161
One justification for not protecting trade dress that was subject o a
previous patent is that this would allow the patentee/trade dress owners
155 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 256 (5th Cir. 1997); see
also Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (portion of invention disclosed but not claimed in patent application is
appropriate subject of trademark law); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138
F.3d 277, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1998) (a disclosed feature of the claimed wire tie was part
of the specification but not the claim and, as such, was not precluded from trade dress
protection).
156 Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500
(10th Cir. 1995).
157 TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 23.
158 See e.g., PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int'l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting anything disclosed, but not claimed is donated to the
public).
159 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996) ("Victory
in an infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim covers the alleged
infringer's product or process, which in turn necessitates a determination of what the
words in the claim mean.") (internal quotations omitted).
160 See id. at 373 (the patent system gives inventors "the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented invention, in
exchange for full disclosure of an invention.").
161 See e.g., Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 400 F.3d 901, 905-06
(Fed. Cir. 2005) ("A determination of patent infringement consists of two steps: (1)
the court must first interpret the claim, and (2) it must then compare the properly
construed claims to the allegedly infringing device .... To prove infringement, the
patentee must show that the accused device meets each claim limitations, either
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.").
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to have two bites at the apple. 162 However, since the scope of the
enforceable patent is limited to the express claims, the disclosures or
specifications for that patent are not typically within the scope of any
patent and, therefore, not enforceable. 163 As a trade dress, they become
enforceable for the first time. 164
That is, it does not make sense to exclude trade dress protection for
any inventive step when that inventive step is not specifically claimed.
The Vornado court got this right as follows: "Where a product
configuration is a significant inventive component of an invention
covered by a utility patent . . . it cannot receive trade dress
protection."
165
By "inventive component," the Vornado court was referring to items
or features specifically claimed by the inventor.166 This is a perfectly
appropriate, although highly nuanced, way to give full faith and credit
to patent law and policy and still allow an entity to use the policies
behind trademark law to reduce transaction costs for consumers. 16'7 The
Vornado court found the correct balance that Justice Kennedy could not
quite name in TrafFix.
That is, there was, actually, no split in the circuits. The courts that
allowed for trade dress protection to be considered regarding something
that previously was the subject of patent protection allowed the trade
dress claim to continue when it was disclosed or specified in the patent
application, but not specifically claimed. 168 The courts that held trade
dress protection was precluded were courts that faced a very different
set of operative facts. 169 In those cases, the claimed trade dress was the
subject of one or more specific claims in the patent.170 As such, giving
162 The United States Constitution limits exclusive rights for a limited period of
time. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
163 PSC Computer, 355 F.3d at 1356.




167 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-71 (1987).
168 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 256-57 n. 20 (5th Cir.
1997) ("[A utility patent must be examined] in detail to determine whether the
disclosed configuration is really primarily functional ...... ) (citing J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:89 (4th ed.
1997)).
169 Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510 ("[A]fter the first patent issued and Vornado
subsequently found evidence that other grill structures worked as well as or better than
the spiral grill, Vornado did not repudiate or disclaim in any way the grill element of
its patent. Instead, Vornado sought and received a reissue patent that expanded its
claims with respect to the grill.").
170 See id. at 1500-02.
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trade dress protection for something otherwise claimed in a patent
would, for sure, be allowing the patentee to have two bites at the apple;
however, allowing trade dress protection for mere specifications or
disclosures would not.
1 71
Although the Court could have apparently given some stare decisis
weight to the counter authority as Justice Stevens demanded in Taco
Cabana, 172 here, the Court summarily dismissed the rulings in
Sunbeam, Thomas & Betts, and Midwest Industries, and sided with
Vornado.1 73 The Court's hesitancy to grant what would amount to a
back door to a perpetual patent is understandable. If the Court
recognized MDI's trade dress, others could construe it as a way to get
perpetual protection for something once patented. This would, of
course, violate the patent policy of granting an expansive monopoly to
the patentee for twenty years in exchange for the patentee's disclosure
of the invention. 174
However, this is not what the Court did in TrafFix. Perhaps this was
in the back of Justice Kennedy's mind when he penned the opinion, but
he did not expressly say that he was worried about a potential overlap
with patent policy should the trade dress survive scrutiny. 175 Telling is
the fact that Justice Kennedy never even seriously inquired if MDI's
trade dress had secondary meaning. To do that, he should have been
looking for survey evidence or some other indication that consumers
identified MDI's springs as indicating source rather than the product.
In fact, the Court held that secondary meaning was irrelevant because
they found the trade dress functional. 
176
This sets up an interesting logical problem. To show a mark is
worthy of protection, a claimant has to show that the mark has
secondary meaning;1 77 however, the Court says we should not consider
secondary meaning if the mark is functional. 178 However, the Court
said that one way to show a mark is not functional is to show it has
171 Id.
172 Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 784 (Stevens, J., concurring).
173 TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 29-30.
174 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996)
(explaining that the patent system gives inventors "the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented invention, in
exchange for full disclosure of an invention.").
175 See TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 35 (failing to address or express any
concerns about situations in which the "trade dress becomes the practical equivalent
of an expired utility patent.").
176 TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33 ("Functionality having been established,
whether MDI's dual spring design has acquired secondary meaning need not be
considered.").
177 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 171-72.
178 TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33.
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secondary meaning, but, at the same time, precluded a claimant of a
feared functional mark from showing the exact secondary meaning that
would save it. 179
This presumes that we can normatively know, and agree, on what is
a functional mark. Of course, the problem here is that it is taken in
conjunction with the fact that there was an expired utility patent for the
very springs MDI was claiming.180 This circular problem gets us back
to where the Court started: Does the existence of a utility patent
preclude subsequent claims that that design feature previously the
subject of a patent now identifies source and, therefore, is operating as
a trademark?
The Court said that the existence of such an expired patent is "strong
evidence" that the mark is functional. 181 The Court, again, did not
explain its reasoning, but, presumably, that is because a utility patent to
be patentable at all must have "utility" or be functional. 182 However,
the Court ignored the fact (and the reasoning used by the appellate
courts that held differently) that this is a bald conclusion without
support. 183
Why should we presume that once a design feature is claimed to
have utility under the patent act, it NEVER can act to identify source?
One argument, stated above, is that this would interfere with the patent
policy and give potential backdoors to permanent patents.1 84 However,
a trade dress is not a patent; the parameters of the right are extremely
different from and much more narrow than a patent.185 For example, to
be actionable, the subsequent use of a same or similar trade dress must
179 Id.
180 Id. at 29 ("A prior patent, we conclude, has vital significance in resolving the
trade dress claim.").
181 Id.
182 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing that patentable subject matter is limited to
any "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof .... ) (emphasis added).
183 TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33, 35.
184 Margreth Barrett, Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress
Functionality: Encountering TrafFix on the Way to Sears, 61 WASH & LEE L. REv.
79, 146-47 (2004).
185 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). Trade dress protection "secure[s] to the owner
of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to
distinguish among competing producers," by allowing the mark holder to bring an
infringement action against the alleged infringer if the alleged infringing mark is likely
to cause confusion among consumers as to whom the mark belongs. Taco Cabana,
505 U.S. at 774 (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,
190 (1985)). Patent protection on the other hand is the right to exclude others from
"mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing] any patented invention," without
permission. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
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confuse consumers. 186 There is no confusion requirement in patent
law. 187 The mere use (working) of the design feature would amount to
an infringement even if it was accidental, unintended, and no one would
be confused by the two uses.188
That is, patent policy and trade dress policy are already quite distinct
entities. We need further justification than simply to say the design
feature was subject to a utility patent and that alone is "strong evidence"
that the trade dress is now (perhaps many years later) functional and, if
it is functional, the claimant is precluded from showing that the trade
dress has secondary meaning to defeat the precise functionality that is
precluding recovery.
Most commentators have just accepted the rationale that trademark
policy should not interfere with patent policy. 189 If the claimed trade
dress is identifying source, there is no patent policy to interfere with
except if the trade dress was subject to a prior utility patent. 19 If we
allow a prior patentee to ever gain trade dress protection, it might not
be the worst thing, as the Court implies. 191
Of course, if we flesh out the Court's opinion, we might think about
a situation where trade dress was allotted protection even though it had
been the subject of a prior utility patent. In those circumstances, one
could see and maybe expect, that an intelligent user of such a patent
would work during the term of the patent to create secondary meaning
in the patented invention. Then, when the patent expired, the patentee
could change their hat and say, "now I am claiming that the design
feature identifies source and the functional aspect of that design feature
has been exterminated." During this lead-up time to secondary
meaning, the patentee would be enjoying the broad patent monopoly
and have an easier time creating exclusive use and therefore secondary
meaning.
186 Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 769 ("It is of course, also undisputed that liability
under § 43(a) requires proof of the likelihood of confusion.").
187 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
188 See, e.g., Global Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2065 n. 2
(2011) ("Direct infringement has long been understood to require no more than the
unauthorized use of a patent invention. Thus, a direct infringer's knowledge or intent
is irrelevant.").
189 E.g., Lee B. Burgunder, Can the PTO Find Its Way with Jesus?, 19 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 63, 88 (2015) ("The root of functionality is to ensure that
trademarks do not interfere with patent policies by protecting unpatented product
features hat the patent laws should be free for all to use."); Christopher R. Leslie,
Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Part of Innovation Policy, 34 J. CORP. L.
1259, 1265 (2009) (explaining that antitrust enforcement need not interfere with patent
policy).
190 TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 29, 32.
191 See id. at 34-35.
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One can easily see how that situation would be possible. But, would
it be so likely that we should preclude (giving nomenclatures like
"strong evidence") a trade dress claimant who had an expired utility
patent for the same design feature from recovery?
This is all to state one simple fact: With TrafFix, the Supreme Court
made the concept of a trademark narrower than it had been.192 If the
Court is afraid of broad trademark rights, it begs the question of why?
What is there about broad trademark rights the Court knows that is anti-
competitive or monopolistic or something that encourages the Court to
restrain them? Also, if broad trademark rights are so dangerous, why
doesn't the Court tell us what those dangers are?
I am not advocating for broad trademark rights. I think the
institution of broad trademark rights in the form of Park 'N Fly,
Qualitex, and the like has encouraged trademark owners to engage in
speculative conduct. This speculative conduct could be why trademark
bullying found its footing.193 If an otherwise descriptive and worthless
trademark (like "PARK 'N FLY") or the silly design of an obvious
Mexican restaurant is appropriate trademark subject matter, it seems
that all limitations to trademark protection have ended. That is, if the
Supreme Court of the United States accepts as trade dress a "festive
eating atmosphere," 194 why would others not claim anything they can
think of?
TrafFix acts as an initial break to this trend. The Court is
recognizing the challenges that its expansive rulings in trademark law
have created and has, with TrafFix, started to rein trademark law back
in. 195 After all, in TrafFix, Justice Kennedy could easily have stated a
bright line distinction. If one's trade dress was ever subject to a specific
claim in a patent application, it would be barred from trademark
protection; if one's trade dress was merely part of the specification or
disclosure in a patent application, it would be free to claim it as their
trade dress, subject, of course, to proving a likelihood of confusion. He
did not take the bright line.1 96 Instead, Justice Kennedy, in fact, takes
the opposite tract:
In a case where a manufacturer seeks to protect
192 Id. at 29-30.
193 "Trademark bullying" is variously defined, but he best definition is that it
occurs when a holder of a non-famous trademark attempts to assert the mark against
non-competitors. Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion Revisited: A Response to
Vogel and Schachter, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 217 (2014) (demonstrating
that trademark bullying is present in 5.5% of the reported cases).
194 Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. at 765.
195 See TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 29-30.
196 Id. at 34.
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arbitrary, incidental, or ornamental spects of features of
a product found in the patent claims, such as arbitrary
curves in the legs or an ornamental pattern painted on the
springs, a different result might obtain. There, the
manufacturer could perhaps prove that those aspects do
not serve a purpose within the terms of the utility
patent. 197
That is, Justice Kennedy provides the opportunity to claim trade
dress protection even when the trade dress is specifically named in a
utility patent's claims. This provides almost no direction to would-be
claimants of trade dress protection. As the principle case on trade dress
protection does not use easy bright line distinctions that it could have,
Justice Kennedy seems to be both encouraging and iscouraging trade
dress claims at the same time.
Therefore, TrafFix does not act as complete brake to the expansion
of trademark law, but rather, an easing of the brake. In 2001, the Court
recognized with TrafFix that expansive trademark rights may not be the
best thing, yet left open the possibility of using a claim in an expired
utility patent as possible appropriate subject matter for trademark
protection. 198
D. Wal-Mart v. Samara
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., the Court
thoroughly applied the brakes to trademark expansion. 1 99 That is, after
the decision in Taco Cabana in 1992, pressure was growing on the
Court to explain what inherently distinctive trade dress was and how it
could be defined, registered and litigated20 0 In Wal-Mart, the Court
determined that no matter how hard an alleged infringer tried to copy
the plaintiffs unregistered trade dress, if that plaintiffs trade dress
lacked secondary meaning, trademark protection would not survive and
otherwise infringing entities could slavishly copy the product.201
Wal-Mart tried and succeeded in copying Samara's children's
197 Id.
198 Id. at 35.
199 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
200 See Karina K. Terakura, Comment, Insufficiency of Trade Dress Protection:
Lack of Guidance for Trade Dress Infringement Litigation in the Fashion Design
Industry, 22 HAw. L. REv. 569, 592-93 (2000).
21 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216 ("We hold that in an action for infringement of
unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product's design is
distinctive, and therefore protectable, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.").
Wal-Mart actually came before TrafFix in time but they are so close to each other it is
not relevant.
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pajamas.2 0 2 Wal-Mart sent pictures of the pajamas to designers in the
Philippines and asked them to design pajamas that looked just like
Samara's goods.2 °3 In some photos, Samara's label baring its trademark
was even visible. 204 The final product looked just like Samara's
goods.205 Wal-Mart succeeded in producing a close replica of Samara's
goods and sold them for far less than Samara was selling them.206
Never mind how bad Wal-Mart acted, the Court held.0 7 They did
not hold and did not cite International News Service v. Associated
Press,208 but this is clearly not like a "hot news" exception where the
alleged infringer's conduct was so bad that, as a matter of natural rights,
infringement would be found. Rather, the Court held that even slavish
copying as here is not only permitted but encouraged in our American
society if the claimant of trademark rights cannot show that the object
of protection possessed secondary meaning.
209
That is, "any" does not mean "any" anymore. The first restriction
was that a trade dress may not be functional and be worthy of trademark
protection. The second restriction was that all trade dress must possess
secondary meaning.
Most troubling in the Wal-Mart case was that the Supreme Court
certified as the question presented to the Court a simple clarification of,
in light of Taco Cabana, when trade dress was inherently distinctive.210
In Justice Scalia's remarkably short opinion of a mere fourteen pages,
he completely changed the law as we knew it of when trade dress was
protectable at all.21 In Taco Cabana, Justice Thomas' concurrence
claimed that trade dress was trademark and the two should not be
doctrinally distinguished.21 2 In Wal-Mart, Justice Scalia presented a
much different view. Trade dress, he determined, can be separated into
213three types.
The first type is product packaging that can be inherently
distinctive.214 When and what evidence would be used to establish that
is not clear from the opinion. Second, product design or product
202 Id. at 207-08.
203 Id.
204 See Brief for Respondent, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529
U.S. 205 (2000) (No. 99-150), 1999 WL 1249422, at *5.
205 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 208.
206 Id. at 207-08.
207 See id. at 216.
208 Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
209 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
210 See id. at 207.
211 Id. at 211.
212 Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 787 (Thomas, J., concurring).
213 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212.
214 Id. at 210.
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configuration, like in Wal-Mart, may never be inherently distinctive and
must always possess secondary meaning to be protectable.215 What are
we to make of Taco Cabana in these circumstances? Rather than
answer the question presented, Justice Scalia dismissed Taco Cabana
as a "tertium quid," some third thing with which he will not be
bothered. 216
Not only did Justice Scalia abdicate his responsibility to answer the
question presented, he specifically engaged in judicial activism to
restrain the growth of trademark law.217 So important was this effort,
he apparently believed, that he should go against his well-stated
principles of what the Court's job was and how inappropriate judicial
activism was for our American society.218 Rather, Justice Scalia threw
all that to the wind and set out on his own to reshape the landscape of
trade dress protection and invent these three types of trade dress.2 19
In fact, Justice Scalia expressly disagreed with his conservative
brother, Justice Thomas, from his concurrence in Taco Cabana.
220
There, Justice Thomas said that the text of Section 43(a) allowed for the
protection of the "festive eating atmosphere." 221 Justice Thomas
concluded that trade dress protection, through Section 43(a), should be
protected as a trademark with no conceptual problems.222
Justice Scalia disagreed: "The text of § 43(a) provides little
guidance as to the circumstances under which unregistered trade dress
may be protected.,
223
After Wal-Mart, Taco Cabana, Qualitex, and TrafFix, one is left
wondering where the actual parameters are for trademark/trade dress
protection. After all, Justice Scalia could have, but did not, overrule
Taco Cabana. As such, Taco Cabana is good law, even if it is a
215 Id. at 215.
216 Id.
217 See generally Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. 205.
218 See Bob Ward, In Snowmass, Justice Antonin Scalia Says Judges Should Not
Be Policymakers, THE ASPEN TIMES, http://www.aspentimes.com/news/7382102-
113/scalia-judges-society-court (last visited Aug. 14, 2015).
219 For this proposition, Justice Scalia states as follows: "Competition is deterred,
however, not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit,
and given the unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying design, the game of
allowing suit based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness eems to us not worth the
candle." Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
221 Compare id. at 210 (reasoning that the statutory text does not offer guidance
as to when unregistered trade dress maybe protected), with Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at
786-87 (Thomas, J., concurring), reh 'g denied, 505 U.S. 1244 (1992) (concluding
statutory text allows for trade dress protection through use of a trademark).
221 Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 786-87.
222 Id. at 787.
223 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 210.
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"tertium quid.,2 2 4 It most certainly is inconsistent with Wal-Mart in
spirit, if not in doctrine. In Taco Cabana, the Court was expanding
trademark rights; in Wal-Mart, the Court clearly restrained trademark
rights.225 That, of course, begs the question of what did they become
afraid of?
The Court clearly became afraid of mixing and matching one's
intellectual property claims to suit the individual plaintiffs needs and
fancy. That is, something for which a design patent should have been
obtained but was not, should not be saved by trade dress protection,
which would, in essence, give the claimant a perpetual patent in the
design. If the object of protection had secondary meaning, the claimed
226 iappellation would be outside of the realm of patent protection, and in
the world of trademark protection, therefore protectable. If it did not
have secondary meaning, and was not the subject of a design patent, the
claimant was out of luck.227
Product packaging does not have the same capacity to interfere with
the policy behind patent protection, Justice Scalia would have us
believe, therefore, it does not raise the same concerns.
E. Dastar
The final nail in the coffin, or, keeping with the lame analogy from
above, the application of the emergency brake to the expansion of
trademark law, came in the form of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp. 228 In Dastar, the claimant, Fox, tried to assert
trademark protection to protect the material in a documentary that might
have been protected using copyright law, but the copyright to that
material had expired and was not renewed. 229 Fox argued that the
footage identified it as the source or origin of the movie and therefore,
if "any" meant "any," it had trademark-like rights in the material for
which copyright protection had expired.230
Although this seems like a logical argument given the expanding
notion of trademark law in Park 'N Fly, Taco Cabana, and Qualitex by
this time, post-Wal-Mart, this argument was dead on arrival. As the
224 Id. at 215.
225 See Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 767; Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216.
226 See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989).
227 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216.
228 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
229 Id. at 25-28.
231 Id. at 27 (alleging that Dastar's sale of the documentary "without proper credit"
to the Crusade television series constitutes "reverse passing off' in violation of § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act).
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Supreme Court has gone into a mode of curtailing trademark rights
rather than expanding them, the creative use of trademark law in Dastar
would not be allowed.231
F. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.
The Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. case attracted wide
attention because of its extremely entertaining facts. Substantively, it
has been said that it "may be the most significant new millennium
trademark case.2 32 The facts, entertaining as they are, can be briefly
stated. Victor and Cathy Moseley opened an adult novelty store titled
"Victor's Secret" and later "Victor's Little Secret.,233 It was opened
near an Army base near Elizabethtown, Kentucky.234 The Moseleys
advertised and sold such interesting items as lingerie and "Adult
Novelties/Gifts. '' 235 The Moseley's trademark appeared as follows:
11ITL
236
Almost as entertaining as the basic facts of the case, an Army
colonel, offended by the roadside attraction, saw this store advertising
its wares in a newspaper and subsequently informed Victoria's
231 Id. at 38 ("For merely saying it is the producer of the video, however, no
Lanham Act liability attaches to Dastar.").
232 Welkowitz, supra note 92, at 1681 (2004).
233 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 423 (2003).
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Brian Wassom, Rule 34 and Trademark Dilution, WASSOM.COM (Sept. 19,
2014), http://www.wassom.com/rule-34-trademark-dilution.html.
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Secret.237 After all, we could never imagine an Army colonel to debase
himself in order to frequent such an establishment.
Victoria's Secret soon filed suit; however, its trademark
infringement claim was dismissed and they did not appeal that claim. 238
Victoria's Secret did, however, prevail on its trademark dilution claim,
which had also been dismissed at trial.239 Trademark dilution is a cause
of action that holders of famous marks can bring against any use,
competitive or not, of their famous and distinctive trademarks.240
Although the facts are entertaining and the manner that Victoria's
Secret learned of the alleged infringing or dilutive conduct is comical,
Moseley was litigated and adjudicated consistently with trademark
doctrine.
Victoria's Secret did not prevail on its claim of infringement in
district court, and it did not appeal that verdict.241 In a world where
trademark litigants sometimes ignore or minimize trademark doctrine
in order to prevail in a certain case, it is remarkable that Victoria's
Secret followed trademark doctrine in such a close manner. That is,
trademark infringement, as stated above, is a cause of action that is to
be brought by an entity against a competitor. Traditionally, if there is
no competition between the parties, there, by definition, can be no
infringement.
That is, Victoria's Secret apparently knew that, in order to prevail
on appeal on the trademark infringement claim, they would have to
emphasize the competition between Victoria's Secret (a high-end and
self-determined classy lingerie empire) and Victor's Little Secret (a
low-end, roadside attraction selling sex toys and the like). Said in very
crude terms, the soft-porn manufacturer would have to admit to be in
competition with the hard-porn manufacturer. Victoria's Secret did the
very wise thing and did not enter this debate by not appealing the finding
that there was no trademark infringement.
Victoria's Secret did appeal the dilution verdict against it. 2 4 2 This
237 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423.
238 V Secret Catalogue Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 WL 370525, at
*4 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2000).
239 Id. at *6, aff'd, 259 F.3d 464, 477 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding grant of summary
judgment for plaintiffs).
24 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 420-21 ("In 1995 Congress amended § 43 of the
Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, to provide a remedy for the 'dilution of
famous marks.' 109 Stat. 985-86. That amendment, known as the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (FTDA), describes the factors that determine whether a mark is
'distinctive and famous,' and defines the term 'dilution' as 'the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.").
241 VSecret Catalogue, 2000 WL 370525, at *4.
242 VSecret Catalogue, 259 F.3d at 477.
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appeal and the Supreme Court's holding on dilution in this case fits
perfectly with the thesis of this piece that the Supreme Court has, as of
late, been engaged in restricting the trademark right after decades of
expanding it. It "contains many echoes of Wal-Mart and TrafFix' 243 as
the Supreme Court constricts the trademark right.
In Moseley, the Supreme Court looked at two inconsistent phrases
in the dilution provisions of the Lanham Act and elected to take the
more restrictive course. 244 Specifically before the court was the
question of whether the correct test for dilution was that the plaintiff
had to show a "likelihood of dilution" (which mirrors the trademark
infringement test of "likelihood of confusion") or if the correct test was
something different and required and actual showing of dilution. 245
More specifically, the Lanham Act defines dilution as "the lessening
of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods and
services."246 However, in another place, the Lanham Act states that
relief is authorized if a junior mark "causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the [senior] mark."
247
That is, is the right test a "likelihood," as Section 1127 seems to
provide by using words "lessening of the capacity" or is actual dilution
required because Section 1125(c)(1) references "causes" dilution?248 It
is easy to see the significance of the difference. If a mere likelihood is
required, it would be much easier for plaintiffs to make out a case of
dilution; if actual dilution is required, this has the potential of
completely extinguishing the cause of action. A likelihood of confusion
can be shown using surveys and other enumerated factors to say if it is
more likely than not that a consumer is to be confused as to the source
of a good or service (trademark infringement).249 The evidence needed
for a showing of actual dilution is onerous.25 It is impossible to collect
evidence that establishes, in any specific case, that a defendant's
conduct causes the trademark at issue to lessen the capacity to
distinguish itself 
251
243 Welkowitz, supra note 92, at 1682-83.
244 Id. at 1683-85.
245 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423-24.
246 Id. at 423 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
247 Id. at 432.
248 Id. at 420, 432. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2012).
249 See generally Moseley, 537 U.S. at 435 (describing the types of evidence that
can show a likelihood of confusion).
250 See generally id. (explaining that it is difficult to establish actual dilution
because of the expense and unreliable nature of consumer data).
251 See generally id. (recognizing that despite consumer surveys and
circumstantial evidence, actual dilution is a difficult burden to carry in trademark
disputes).
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The Supreme Court took the position that actual dilution was needed
to establish trademark dilution and, thereby, nearly extinguished the
cause of action.252 By 2005, there was only one case in all of America
where trademark dilution was the focus of the case and that plaintiff lost
in making a dilution claim. 253 Moseley had the effect of nearly
extinguishing the dilution cause of action.
Some have claimed that "Moseley is not an example of judicial
craftsmanship.254 However, to me, it is a masterful attempt to rein in
a trademark doctrine that had been giving courts 255 and
commentators256 significant consternation ever since its enactment in
252 Id. at 432. By 2004, just one year after the final Supreme Court judgment, there
was only one reported pure dilution case in all of America: DeGidio v. West Group
Corp., 355 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2004). For an empirical explication of the demise of the
dilution doctrine, see The Mitchell Study on Trademark Litigation, WILLIAM
MITCHELL COLL. OF LAW, http://web.wmitchell.edu/intellectual-property/the-
mitchell-study-on-trademark-litigation/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
253 Bell v. Starbucks U.S. Brands Corp., 389 F.Supp.2d 766, 780 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
See Trademark Litigation Search Results, MITCHELL INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST.,
http://app.wmitchell.edu/Trademark/Home/TrdResults?Term-&ddlYear-All+Years
&ddlCourt-All+Courts&ddl (last visited Oct. 12, 2015) (searchable database of all
reported trademark cases from July 5, 1947, the effectiveness date of the Lanham Act
through and including 2011).
254 Welkowitz, supra note 92, at 1682.
255 Although prior to the federal enactment of a dilution statute, this judicial
consternation is, perhaps, nowhere more clearer than in Mead Data Cent., Inc. v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1989) (showing
that in order to avoid applying the New York State dilution statute, the court claimed
that Lexis and Lexus are not similar).
256 Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 789, 795 (1997) (warning that
dilution protections "pose an anticompetitive threat to market efficiency and consumer
welfare"); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1713 (1999) (arguing for judicial vigilance in protecting
trademark theory); Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural"Expansion of Trademark Rights:
Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 434-35
(1994) (arguing against the, at that time, proposed federal dilution act); Simone A.
Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for "Famous" Trademarks: Anti-
Competitive "Monopoly" or Earned "Property" Right?, 47 FLA. L. REv. 653, 740
(1995) (stating that "Atlas will no longer shrug, but welcome the addition of these
earned property rights"); David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44
VAND. L. REv. 531, 533 (1991) (contending that state d that state antidilution statutes
provide overly broad trademark protection); Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Comment, Judicial
Interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 659,
696 (1998). That comment concludes that:
One of the primary motivations for enactment of a federal dilution law was to
provide a single, nationwide solution to the problems of patchwork protection against
the gradual erosion of a mark's distinctiveness. Because dilution is difficult to pin
down and impossible to measure, the FTDA necessarily suffers from some vagueness.
continued...
WAKE FOREST J. [VOL. 16
2015] IN PURSUIT OF CONSTRAINTS ON 171
TRADEMARK BULLIES
1996.257 If viewed from a broad perspective, Moseley stands for the
proposition that trademark dilution cause of action needs some clear
parameters.258 If something called "dilution" actually is possible and
actually does happen in the marketplace, the Supreme Court's view is
that it should be demonstrated.259 There should be no presumption of
dilution that a "likelihood" standard would allow.26 ° If a mark is
diluted, the Supreme Court is saying, then prove it.
26 1
In other words, this may be the most careful act of restraining the
trademark right that we have considered in this article. Although
Congress disagreed and revised the Lanham Act to make the test for
trademark dilution a "likelihood of dilution,, 262 the Supreme Court's
view on the topic is clear. In keeping with TrafFix and Wal-Mart, the
trademark right ought to be a more limited right.263
Perhaps in part because Congress overruled the Supreme Court in
Moseley, the stage was set for a broad pronouncement hat would limit
the trademark right even if there were apparently disagreeable statutory
references or even a prior Supreme Court case that the Court no longer
entirely endorsed.
This in turn makes a uniform, nationwide solution unlikely, at least until a significant
FTDA case reaches the Supreme Court.
William Marroletti, Note, Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Need For a
Clear International Standard to Determine Trademark Dilution, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 659, 692 (1999). That note posits that:
Dilution protection is a largely unnecessary and costly safeguard that can
undermine the objectives of trademark law by producing anti-competitive results. A
likelihood of dilution determination is conceptually difficult to apply and as a result
courts rely on it unnecessarily. In addition, the injury is speculative and difficult o
measure.
257 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, H.R. 1295, 104th Cong. (1996).
258 Welkowitz, supra note 92, at 1684.
259 See Kenneth L. Port, The Unnatural Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a
Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 447-48 (1994).
261 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
261 Id. at 434.
262 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
263 TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 29.
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V. OVERRULING BY IMPLICATION: KP PERMANENT MAKE-UP
The final (for the time being) word from the Supreme Court on the
scope of trademark protection is the, essentially, unanimous264 opinion
of KP Permanent Make-Up. 265  In KP Permanent Make-Up, it is
appropriate to see a Court that was clearly worried about the expansion
of trademark rights and was laboring to restrict them.266 As such, in KP
Permanent Make-Up, the Court held that a descriptive mark used
descriptively would constitute trademark fair use and therefore not an
infringement.267 Although this case is couched in the terms of whether
or not a plaintiff has the burden of proof of showing confusion even in
the light of fair use,268 the result is a complete curtailing of the Park 'N
Fly doctrine.
In Park 'N Fly, the Court held that a descriptive mark could be an
enforceable mark if it was incontestable.269 In KP Permanent Make-
Up, the Court held that even in light of the fact that KP Permanent
Make-Up's mark was incontestable, the fact that it was descriptive gave
competitors a right to use it. 270 These two statements should be seen as
inconsistent because they are.
In Taco Cabana, Justice Stevens concurred and claimed that lower
court precedent bound him to the broad interpretation of trademark
264 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 113 (heading) ("Souter, J., delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, in which Scalia, J., joined as to all but footnotes 4
and 5, and in which Breyer, J., joined as to all but footnote 6.").
265 Id. Of course, B&B Hardware Inc. v. Hargis Industries Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293
(2015) might be seen as expanding the reach of the TTAB but, as it is not an opinion
regarding substantive trademark law, it is excluded from this analysis.
266 See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68 (1991).
267 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 124.
268 Id. (concluding that "in sum, a plaintiff claiming infringement of an
incontestable mark must show likelihood of consumer confusion as part of the prima
facie case, while the defendant has no independent burden to negate the likelihood of
any confusion in raising the affirmative defense that a term is use descriptively, not as
a mark, fairly, and in good faith.").
269 Park "NFly, 469 U.S. at 205 (concluding "that the holder of a registered mark
may rely on incontestability to enjoin infringement and that such an action may not be
defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive.").
270 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 122 (stating that "the common law's
tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of consumers followed from the
very fact that in cases like this one an originally descriptive term was selected to be
used as a mark, not to mention the undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a
complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first. The
Lanham Act adopts a similar leniency .... ).
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rights in that case.271 In KP Permanent Make-Up, the Court ignored
existing Supreme Court precedent in the form of Park 'N Fly and
eviscerated the incontestability doctrine.272 If the Court allowed for the
expansive reading in Park 'N Fly, one wonders why it does not allow
the same expansive reading in KP Permanent Make-Up. If the Court is
concerned with the expansion of trademark rights, it should do the
intellectually honest thing and overrule Park 'N Fly. With KP
Permanent Make-Up, the Court has rendered Park 'N Fly useless.
Every alleged infringer of a descriptive but incontestable mark should
simply now argue that the mark is descriptive and that the defendant is
using the mark descriptively. That is, the Park 'N Fly doctrine gave
holders of descriptive trademark rights the ability to enforce them; the
KP Permanent Make-Up case took that right away.
Not only does KP Permanent Make-Up render Park 'N Fly useless,
it guts the value of the incontestability doctrine. As I have argued
elsewhere,273 incontestability is a troubling concept in our common law
system, but it is the law that we have relied upon for nearly seventy
years.274 To eviscerate incontestability with the KP Permanent Make-
Up decision is a clear form of judicial activism that this conservative
Supreme Court pretends to abhor.275
Of what is the conservative Supreme Court afraid? Conservatives
believe that property rights are absolute.276 It seems that this basic
principle would teach away from extending "fair use."
VI. SECTION 33(B)(4)
The apparent first time in reported judicial history where Section
33(b)(4) was specifically labeled as a "fair use" defense occurred in
1981.277 This language appears to be derived from the language in
271 Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. at 785 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing to Stevens'
concurrence).
272 See KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 122.
273 See generally Port, supra note 5.
274 Id.
275 THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE
ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 1 (2004).
276 Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 565-68 & n.99 (2006) ("The typical argument
was purely circular: It reasoned that deception was conclusively presumed because a
trademark was an absolute property right and therefore supported liability without
proof of deception.").
277 In re Schmid Labs. v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 14, 20-21
(D.N.J. 1979). Numerous times, the Court has described something akin to our current
day understanding of "fair use" but they did not use that term to describe it. See, e.g.,
Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 324 (1871).
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Section 33(b)(4) that states that otherwise infringing ought to be
forgiven if it is "used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users
the goods ... of [a] party.,278 The copyright statute uses the same "fair
use" language to describe a right that is significantly disparate from the
trademark fair use.
279
The copyright fair use defense is an affirmative defense that is only
reached after the plaintiff shows, or the defendant concedes, that illicit
copying happened in any given case.280 That is, it is only referenced
after liability is established and forgives that otherwise infringing
conduct.281  In trademark law, the so-called fair use defense is an
absolute defense that prevents the court from considering whether the
plaintiffs mark and the defendant's mark are confusingly similar.282
That is, trademark fair use is referenced before liability is established.
In trademark law, if fair use is found, the case is terminated and no
showing of infringement is made.283  This is the holding in the KP
Permanent Make- Up case.284
278 Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (2015).
279 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), with 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012) ("That
the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise
than as a mark,... of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in
good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party ... ").
280 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); 4 WILLIAM F.
PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:9 (2015) ("[Flair use is an affirmative defense, and
as such comes into play only if and after the plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case.").
281 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574 ("It is uncontested here that 2 Live Crew's song
would be an infringement of Acuff-Rose's rights in 'Oh, Pretty Woman,' under the
Copyright Act of 1976, but for a finding of fair use through parody.").
282 EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, Inc., 228 F.3d
56, 64 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing fair use as an absolute defense to a Lanham act
claim). Therefore, as an absolute defense in trademark law, fair use should operate as
a defense up front to trademark bullying. The Ninth Circuit has recently taken this
approach to fair use in copyright takedown proceedings under the Copyright Digital
Millennium Act. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., Nos. 13-16106, 13-16107, 2015 WL
5315388, at *4-5 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015) (holding that copyright fair use in the
context of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's take down procedures is a barrier
to infringement claims).
283 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 116-18 (reversing the 9th Circuit's
holding that it was error for the district court to have addressed the fair use defense
without delving into the likelihood of confusion analysis).
284 Id.
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Additionally, historically, Section 33(b)(4) was not a general "fair
use" notion. The fair use doctrine was typically invoked in comparative
advertising cases where use of another's mark was necessary to describe
truthfully a characteristic of the defendant's product.285 In a 1979 case
where the term "fair use" was used, two competing companies used the
term "ribbed" on their packages for condoms.286 The plaintiff had a
registration for "SENSI-RIBBED.287 The defendant used "ribbed" on
its packaging to describe an attribute of its condoms.288
The court held that the term "ribbed" was used by defendant as
something other than an identifier of source and in a fair and good faith
manner to describe its products.289 That is, this so-called "fair use
defense" was originally conceived of as a defense in comparative
advertising cases.29 ° It is, therefore, not surprising that KP Permanent
Make-Up and Lastings were competitors. As any trademark
infringement claim has to be between competitors before it is
actionable, there is no normative fair use defense in trademark
infringement. This defense would be better labeled the "fair use
between competitors defense" to be conceptually consistent with
trademark doctrine.
This is another reason why claiming trademark rights are absolute
and not an extremely nuanced and context-specific right is very
dangerous. Trademark rights (as opposed to dilution rights291) subsist
only between competitors.292 Even this so-called fair use defense is
285 See Societe Comptoir De L'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v.
Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1962); Herbert Prods., Inc. v.
S & H Indus., Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. 247, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
286 In re SchmidLabs, 482 F. Supp. at 20.
287 Id. at 16.
288 Id. at 17.
289 Id. at 20-21.
290 Frederick Warne & Co., Inc. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1198
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that "the fair use doctrine is typically invoked in comparative
advertising cases.").
291 The owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired
distinctiveness, is entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time
after the owner's mark has become famous commences use of a mark or trade name
in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or tarnishment of the famous
mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury. 98 AM. JuR. 3D Proof of Facts § 313 (2015).
292 See, e.g., Interspace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1983)
("The closer the relationship between the products, and the more similar their sales
contexts, the greater the likelihood of confusion."); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:1 (4th ed. 2015). I do
not intend here to enter the debate about "related goods." The related goods doctrine
is not part of traditional trademark jurisprudence and not evenly applied by the courts.
continued...
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only applicable between competitors.293 Therefore, there is no fair use
defense to a trademark dilution claim. This is yet another advantage to
marks which become famous. Once famous, such marks become
protected by the trademark dilution statute and, accordingly, cannot be
subject to the fair use defense.294 First, such marks are not "descriptive"
marks, such marks are famous marks and, therefore, very strong.295
Second, dilution, by definition, is supposed to apply "regardless" of
competition between the parties.296 Trademark infringement is only
actionable when there is competition between the parties.297 Therefore,
famous marks are enforced against non-competitors and, as such, the
defense of fair use based on Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act,
therefore, is inappropriate.298
KP Permanent Make-Up so undermined Park 'N Fly that it should
be said to have overruled it by implication or sub silentio. This is a very
dangerous and unsettling reality of the United States Supreme Court's
trademark jurisprudence. The fact remains that the last thirty years have
seen the Court switch from being extremely generous to trademark
holders to being quite restrictive. Further, the Court's view of
overruling by implication is also troubling; "[i]f a precedent of this
Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should
Some famous treatise writers seem to endorse the view, but, one way or another, it is
not part of the conceptual justification of trademark jurisprudence in the United States
and, in fact, may be entirely distinguishable.
293 See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002)
(explaining prior to KP Permanent Make-Up that the classic fair use defense
complements the likelihood of consumer confusion analysis-this may be a better
normative result but the Court in KP Permanent Make-Up did not adopt this view).
294 98 AM. JuR. 3D Proof of Facts § 313 (2015).
295 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012) ("[A] mark is famous if it is widely
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of
source of the goods or services of the mark's owner."). A famous mark is a distinctive
mark and a distinctive mark is a strong mark.
296 Id. at §1125(c)(1) (explaining that the owner of a distinctive famous mark is
entitled to an injunction for dilution of a famous mark "regardless of the presence or
absence of... competition ... ").
297 See, e.g., Interspace, 721 F.2d at 462 ("The closer the relationship between the
products, and the more similar their sales contexts, the greater the likelihood of
confusion.").
298 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) ("The following shall not be actionable as
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection: (A) Any fair use,
including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a
famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person's
own goods or service, including use in connection with-(i) advertising or promotion
that permits consumers to compare goods or services; or (ii) identifying and
parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or
services of the famous mark owner.") (emphasis added).
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follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.
'" 299
That is, in trademark jurisprudence, the Court is ordering lower
courts to apply Park 'NFly as if KP Permanent Make-Up does not exist.
That begs the obvious question: Are descriptive but incontestable
trademarks worthy of protection or not? Park 'N Fly says yes; KP
Permanent Make-Up says no. The only thing an otherwise infringer of
an incontestable mark needs to do to avoid liability is to argue that it
used the descriptive mark descriptively.00 If it does, Park 'N Fly has
no weight and is eviscerated by KP Permanent Make-Up.
The Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc.
claims authority to overrule its own decisions. It commands lower
courts to follow whichever of its decisions "directly control."301 The
only time Park 'N Fly will directly control and KP Permanent Make-
Up can be avoided is when a descriptive and incontestable mark is used
in a non-descriptive manner.30 2 That non-descriptive manner would be
most likely be in an arbitrary manner. Therefore, if someone had been
able to register "CREAM CHEESE" and it had become incontestable,
KP Permanent Make-Up would not allow the use of "CREAM
CHEESE" on items related to or including cream cheese. It would find
actionable the use of "CREAM CHEESE" on automobiles, for example.
Taking the Park 'N Fly and KP Permanent Make-Up duo at face
value and presuming they are both good law, the result in the "CREAM
CHEESE" example is that arbitrary (non-descriptive) uses would not be
forgiven (relying on KP Permanent Make- Up); however, arbitrary uses
would fall beyond the scope of the trademark (Park 'N Fly) and,
therefore, Park 'N Fly would never come into play. There are no
circumstances where a plaintiff could enlist the Park 'NFly doctrine for
a positive result and not run afoul of the KP Permanent Make-Up
doctrine.
As such, Park 'NFly has been overruled by implication. Of course,
in order to accept this fact, one would also have to accept the traditional
notion of trademark jurisprudence as articulated by the Supreme
Court30 3 and dismiss exaggerated notions that property-based rhetoric
299 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
300 KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 124.
301 Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 484.
302 Park NFly, 469 U.S. at 201.
303 See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)
("There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant o
an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed.");
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) ("[The trademark right] is simply founded
on priority of appropriation.").
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has any place in analyzing trademark jurisprudence.30 4
That is, the Supreme Court has stated many times that there is no
property right in a trademark itself 305 According to the Supreme Court,
the scope of a trademark is confined by its use. 306 Additionally,
trademark law is a subset of unfair competition law.30 7 As such, without
competition, there, by definition, can be no confusion and therefore no
infringement.30 8
Some academics would have us believe that the scope of the
trademark is something more than that. 309 Some assert that the
trademark right is absolute and draw property-like analogies to
trademark jurisprudence. 310 They become confused into believing
intellectual property's own rhetoric. After all, how can trademarks not
be property if they are part of a world known as "intellectual
property?,
311
However, this rhetoric is confused and misplaced. A trademark has
never operated as property in the American system. Trademarks do not,
and never have, satisfied Honore's incidents of ownership.312 As I have
argued before, 313 according to Honore, if something is to be
characterized as "property," it should manifest certain "incidents.,
314
Most relevant here, as it was in 1993, is "the right to possess.,315 In
Honore's terms, this means that the holder has the exclusive right to
304 See MCCARTHY, supra note 292 at § 32:142 (comparing incontestability to the
modem system of recording title to real estate). See also DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEw
TRADEMARK MANUAL 133 (1947) ("On its face, it would appear [incontestability]
means that at some time the title to the property right in the mark is quieted and the
rights of the registrant are forever secure"); Glyn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L. J. 363 (1999) (providing the best critique of this position).
305 See, e.g., United Drug, 248 U.S. at 97 ("There is no such thing as property in
a trade-mark .... ).
306 Id. ("[T]he right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption
.... .).
307 Id. ("The law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair
competition ...").
308 Interspace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1983) ("The closer
the relationship between the products, and the more similar their sales contexts, the
greater the likelihood of confusion.").
309 See Lunney, supra note 304, at 370-72 (critiquing this claim).
310 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 167, at 265 (comparing the economics
of trademark law to that of property rights).
311 Id. at 265-68 ("Since intellectual property is a particularly costly form of
property - ")-
312 See generally A. M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. G. Guest ed., 1961) (listing eleven standard incidents of
ownership).
313 Port, supra note 5, at 554-55.
314 Honore, supra note 312, at 112-13.
315 Id. at 113.
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control a thing and the right to remain in control.3 1 6 As anyone who has
heard of Delta Airlines and Delta faucets, as well as the myriad number
of more current, similar examples, trademark rights are not absolute.
3 17
The metaphorical Delta Airlines of the world may prevent the use of the
same or similar marks on the same or similar goods.31 It may not
prevent the use of its trademark by any entity whatsoever on unrelated
goods or services.319 Trademarks have never been perceived as such
broad grant and the Supreme Court, numerous times, has said that a
trademark itself is not subject to property ownership.32 °
Traditional trademark jurisprudence, as opposed to dilution
jurisprudence, is a form of encouraging and motivating fair
competition. 321 To those ends, competition is necessary before
trademark infringement can occur.
Therefore, if someone registers the mark "PARK 'N FLY" for use
on services of parking cars and then assisting people to the airport where
they will fly, traditional trademark jurisprudence requires an alleged
infringer to be in competition with the entity that holds the "PARK 'N
316 Id.
317 See 145 CONG. REc. 163, 14,713 (1999) ("[T]here may be concurring uses of
the same name that are noninfringing, such as the use of the "Delta" mark for both air
travel and sink faucets .... ."). See also Trademark Basics, BROWN LEGAL,
http://www.brownlegal.com/pages/Trademark / 20Basics.pdf (last visited Oct. 12,
2015) ("[I]f the public can distinguish between two trademarks, the two may co-exist,
such as Delta (airlines) and Delta (faucets) .... ").
318 See Port, supra note 5, at 556-58. This presumes the dilution doctrine is either
illegitimate or does not apply in any of these given circumstances.
319 A similarity of the goods examination is mentioned in every circuit's
"likelihood of confusion" analysis. See Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v.
Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs.
Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc.,
589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978), superseded by rule, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), as
stated in Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 352-53 (3d Cir. filed 2003);
Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Roto-Rooter
Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45 (5th Cir. 1975); Frisch's Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big
Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982); Union Carbide Corp. v.
Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381-82 (7th Cir. 1976), superseded by statute, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 52(a), as stated in Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423,
1429 (7th Cir. 1985); SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980);
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated by
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 (9th Cir. 2003); Beer
Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925-26 (10th Cir. 1986); Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1164 (11th Cir. 1982)
(quoting Roto-Rooter, 513 F.2d at 45).
320 See United Drug, 248 U.S. at 97 ("There is no such thing as property in a trade-
mark .... ).
321 Id. at 97-98 (discussing that trademark law is a part of the law of unfair
competition and is not to be used as a monopoly).
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FLY" mark before an injunction is appropriate.22 In the Park 'N Fly
case, the defendant was arguably in competition with the plaintiff as
they both advertised and sold the service of parking your car at an
airport and getting a ride to the terminal.BaB Therefore, both traditional
trademark jurisprudence and Section 33(b)(4) would apply if we can get
over the fact that Park 'N Fly's mark was descriptive. The Supreme
Court held in that case that incontestability allowed the court to ignore
the fact that the mark was descriptive and therefore otherwise
unenforceable and issue the injunction.
324
However, with the holding in KP Permanent Make-Up, such a mark
as "PARK 'N FLY" is descriptive even though it is incontestable and
therefore, its descriptive use by others should be forgiven.
The only time this trap is avoided is when the putative "PARK 'N
FLY"-like descriptive mark is not used descriptively. As such, "PARK
'N FLY" brand cream cheese would be a non-descriptive use of a
descriptive but incontestable mark. However, under traditional
trademark jurisprudence where competition is necessary, "PARK 'N
FLY" cream cheese could not be enjoined by the plaintiff/holder of the
incontestable "PARK 'N FLY" registered trademark because it is
outside the scope of the use of parking and flying services.
Dilution law would not save such a plaintiff either because, at the
time of the litigation, there was no evidence that "PARK 'N FLY" was
a famous or distinctive mark.
3 25
Therefore, the KP Permanent Make-Up case eviscerated the Park
'N Fly doctrine, rendering it completely useless.2 6 In light of KP
Permanent Make-Up and traditional trademark jurisprudence, there is
no circumstance in which the Park 'N Fly doctrine would logically
apply today. To make it apply, one has to make various contortions
about the scope of the trademark that the Supreme Court has never
agreed with and pretend that the trademark is more than it is.
VII. CONCLUSION
The scope of trademark law has expanded and contracted over time.
The Supreme Court, the principal arbiter in making this determination,
first began expanding the scope of the trademark right with the Park 'N
322 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (stating that "a
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunctive relief must satisfy [the] four-factor test" that
is set forth in eBay).
323 Park "NFly, 469 U.S. at 191-192.
324 Id. at 205.
325 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
326 Bradley Scott Shannon, Overruled by Implication, 33 SEATTLEU. L. REv. 151,
152 (2009).
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Fly decision in 1985. Through a series of Supreme Court cases, that
right was at first further expanded with the Taco Cabana case and the
Qualitex case, and then constricted with the Wal-Mart case and, most
recently, with the KP Permanent Make-Up case.
The KP Permanent Make-Up case is most often cited for the
proposition that a descriptive mark used descriptively amounts to fair
use and such use should be forgiven. However, when juxtaposed
against the Park 'NFly doctrine, it appears that incontestability in the
United States has been eviscerated. With KP Permanent Make-Up,
there are no longer any instances when a descriptive mark should be
relied upon to seek an injunction against another (the Park 'N Fly
doctrine) because every such instance should be met with a claim that
the descriptive mark is being used descriptively and, therefore, fair (the
KP Permanent Make- Up doctrine).
There is a logical inconsistency between Park 'N Fly and KP
Permanent Make-Up. It is not clear that the Supreme Court understood
what they were doing in KP Permanent Make-Up, but the result was
that the Park 'NFly doctrine was so constricted that it can be said to no
longer exist. As such, the Park 'N Fly decision was overruled by
implication and we ought to recognize that fact. The effect of this
determination should be that trademark bullies should be reined in by
one notch. Trademark bullies should no longer be able to attempt to
enforce descriptive marks (even if incontestable) because every such
claim should be met with the absolute defense of trademark fair use.
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